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CLASS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
AND IN CALIFORNIA:
SHATTERING THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM
EDWARD S. LABowITz*

Federal courts do not stage academic tournaments merely for Don
Quixotes to practice knighthood.t
In the heels of the higgling lawyers, Too many slippery ifs and buts
and howevers, Too many doors to go in and out of.
When the lawyers are through
What is there left, Bob?
Can a mouse nibble at it
And find enough to fasten a tooth in?
-Carl Sandburg
Great tyrannies could be worked in Ecology's, or Consumers', no less
than in Liberty's name.T
INTRODUCTION

n recent years, both California1 and federal 2 courts have experienced

a phenomenal increase in the number of civil complaints filed.
While the increase in the quantity of lawyers and in the population
* Member, California Bar. A.B., Princeton University, 1970; J.D., Boalt Hall, University of California, Berkeley, 1973.
t Dionne v. Springfield School Comm., 340 F. Supp. 334, 335 (D. Mass. 1972)

(Wyzanski, J.).
t Louisell, Miller & West, Comments on Vasquez v. Superior Court, 18 U.C.L.A.L.

Rnv 1056, 1064 (1971).
1. The following tables present comparisons of the judicial loads in the California
superior courts in recent years.
Table 1
Number of Judicial Decisions
6/30/71
6/30/70
6/30/69
6/30/68
6/30/62
State
534.5
503.5
487.5
462
332
L.A.
205
189
184
179
120
S.F.
31.5
29.5
29.5
33
22

State
L.A.
S.F.

6/30/71
92,347
49,402
9,905

Table 2
Total Cases Awaiting Trial
6/30/70
6/30/69
88,130
69,261
47,122
36,245
8,304
6,632

6/30/68
56,726
27,079
5,827

6/30/62
46,530
25,037
4,955

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

State
L.A.
S.F.

Table 3
Total Civil Cases Awaiting Trial
6/30/71
6/30/70
6/30/69
6/30/68
83,483
78,214
60,384
50,250
44,586
41,019
30,747
23,200
9,241
7,804
6,395
5,549

6/30/62
44,420
23,796
4,778

State
L.A.
S.F.

Table 4
Total Criminal Cases Awaiting Trial
6/30/71
6/30/70
6/30/69
6/30/68
8,863
9,916
8,877
6,476
4,816
6,103
5,498
3,879
278
664
500
237

6/30/62
2,110
1,241
177

State
L.A.
S.F.

Table 5
No. of Cases Awaiting Trial per Judicial Position
6/30/71
6/30/70
6/30/69
6/30/68
173
175
142
123
241
249
197
151
314
281
225
177

6/30/62
140
209
225

These tables were compiled from the following sources: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
CALIFORNIA COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 112 (1972); id. at 152 (1970); id. at 194
(1963).
The tables indicate that while the number of judicial positions has increased by
almost 200 statewide during the nine year period, the number of cases awaiting trial
per judicial position has also increased.
The Los Angeles County Clerk recently stated that there was a 4.5 percent rise in
the number of civil court filings in Los Angeles County, from 45,742 in 1971 to 47,833
in 1972. L.A. Daily Journal, Jan. 19, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
2. The federal courts experienced the following percentage increases in the number of cases filed in fiscal year 1971 over fiscal year 1970: civil rights-28.9 percent;
commerce-77.9 percent; securities, commodities and exchange-62 percent; and antitrust-15 percent. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORT 28,107 (1971).
There were 140,000 federal district court filings in fiscal 1972 compared with
88,000 in 1959. Chief Justice Burger has noted that increasing the number of judges
has not solved the overload problem partly because "the trial of cases, particularly criminal cases and some others, had become more complex and protracted so that statistics
do not tell the whole story." Burger, Has the Time Come?, 55 F.R.D. 119 (1972).
Chief Justice Burger has also noted that even if the federal judiciary solves the overload problem by elimination of certain types of cases, the state courts will be forced to
take on the new burden. Id. at 121. See generally Burger, The State of the Judiciary1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).
There were 1,300 U.S. Supreme Court filings in 1931; in 1971, there were 4,000.
The number of civil appeals in the federal system jumped from 2,322 in 1960 to 7,001
in 1970. The number of conviction appeals increased from 623 in 1960 to 3,161 in
1970. Compared to those three, four, and ten-fold increases in the case load, the increase in the number of federal appellate judgeships between 1960 and 1970 was insignificant; from 68 to 97.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,

AN-

99, 104 (1970); id. at 210, 223 (1960).
For the California Supreme Court, the following numbers of filings per year may be
compared:
NUAL REPORT
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itself obviously has contributed to the upsurge in litigation, 3 social
historians will some day point to causes for this phenomenon, 4 including urbanization, increases in the number and value of business
transactions; heightened consumer, environmental and civil rights
concern; and expanded education. Perhaps Alexis de Tocqueville's
observation that Americans like to convert the most diverse sorts of
controversies into legal terms 5 is more applicable today than 140 yearsago. A United States Supreme Court clerk has remarked:
I never realized how litigious people in this country are until I
YEAR

NUMBER OF FILINGS

1971
1970
1969
1968
1962

3,179
3,400
3,322
2,959
1,438

The following figures are for the California courts of appeal:
YEAR
NUMBER OF FILINGS
1971
1970
1969
1968
1962

8,684
8,039
6,874
6,411
3,250

These tables were compiled from the following sources:

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
CALIFORNIA COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 88-89 (1972); id. at 128-29 (1970); id. at 173

(1963).
3. The legal assistance programs funded by private and government sources have
probably contributed to availability of lawyers to certain economic and ethnic groups for
the first time. One court has said:
There is no certain basis for the assumption that an interested holder of a small
claim will be unable to prevail upon a private attorney to pursue that claim in
the hope of being compensated by the award of "reasonable counsel fees"
against a wrongdoer. Moreover, the burgeoning in recent years of interest in
publicly supported legal service organizations and of private support for legal
aid and public interest law firms cannot be disregarded ....
Many small but
important claims heretofore, for purposes of litigation, beyond the pale of
financial practicability, have been successfully litigated by such organizations in
recent years. Thus an adverse class action decision may ring out as a death
knell on far fewer occasions than superficial analysis would suggest.
Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 623 (3d Cir.) (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972).
However, it is possible that President Nixon's recent dismantling of the Office of
Economic Opportunity may destroy the legal services system, unless it is funded by other
federal or state government sources.
4. One law professor, now a philosopher-king, has posited the novel theory that
"Consciousness III" is a potent new concomitant in the development of awareness of
one's place in the universe. See C. REIcH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1971). Most
social historians, however, would find it hard to believe that all contemporary change
is related to the same "consciousness."
5. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 357-58 (1898).
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did some work in comparative law...
Here, people are expected
to stick up for their rights. They're not afraid to sue their neighbor.
But in other parts of the world, especially Asia, only the most ill-bred
person thinks in terms of his own rights. Controversies are conciliated.
People bargain in a very polite way. Filing suit is almost shameful.0
Changes in civil substantive and procedural law have also made the
7
courts more accessible and litigation more desirable during this period.
Unfortunately, the courts at all levels have been unable to keep
pace with the demands of this litigation.8 Some writers have suggested
that more courts be created and that more judges be appointed. 0
While it is difficult to quarrel with the suggestion that more judgeships be created, such a program would be expensive and, even if undertaken on a grand scale, would not alleviate all congestion. Even if
6. L.A. Times, Dec. 19, 1972, at 1, 12-13, col. 1. Professor Lubman, one of this
country's foremost scholars of Chinese law, has written that
Confucianism, the dominant political philosophy in pre-Communist China,
stressed the virtues of compromise, yielding, and nonlitigiousness. The organization of the imperial Chinese state, the operation of its governing institutions,
and its traditional social nuclei-family, clan, village, and guild-combined
to create pressures and institutions for extrajudicial mediation.
Lubman, Mao and Meditation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China,
55 CALIF. L. REv. 1284, 1286 (1967). However, Professor Lubman also noted that
because of geographic distance, the non-expertise of magistrates, corruption, and the
humiliation suffered by parties and witnesses, "[1]itigation was, in short, time-consuming,
degrading, and costly." Id. at 1296.
7. Examples of state civil procedural law alterations include the adoption of broad
discovery tools. See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 364 P.2d
266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961) (court recognized the broad discovery allowed by the
federal rules as precedent for the new California discovery statutes); CAL. CIV. PRO.
CODE §§ 2002-36 (West 1955).
Examples of federal substantive law changes include: Civil Rights Act of 1968,
18 U.S.C. § 245, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970); Labor Management Relations Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000
et seq. (1970). Criminal procedure law changes are exemplified by Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). Very few of the major criminal procedure decisions of the last
decade were applied retroactively. Nevertheless, the ground broken by such decisions
obviously provided incentives for the filing of petitions to review convictions and postconviction motions. See materials cited note 2 supra.
8. See Burger, supra note 2. See also materials cited notes 1 & 2 supra. Apparently,
various measures have been adopted in Los Angeles County over the last one and onehalf years which have shortened the waiting period for jury trials from 36 months to
16 months. Loring, Improving the Administration of Justice in Los Angeles County,
6 J. Bav. H.B.A. 20 (1972). While adoption of such measures may shorten time once
the litigants are prepared for trial, it is unlikely that they will improve the efficiency of
class action discovery, pleadings, or motion procedures and would thus not have a great
impact on the overall amount of time during which a class action is pending.
9. A special panel of law professors and jurists chaired by Professor Paul Freund
has recommended that a national court of appeals be created to lighten the Supreme
Court's load and to certify cases to the Court. L.A. Times, Dec. 20, 1972, at 22, col. 1.
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such a program were initially successful, it would ultimately create
new demands by potential litigants who previously rejected legal action because of the extensive waiting periods before trial. 10 The courts
must be more cautious than they have been in the immediate past
and avoid experimental reshaping of rights and remedies in the business and consumer fields" without careful study of the possible effects
2
of such experiments on the judicial system.1
This article focuses on the contemporary business and consumer
class action' 3 as such an experimental device which has grown to the
point where class allegations may be as frequent and boilerplate as
punitive damage prayers.' 4 The federal class action, seen only six years
10. In analyzing the reasons fewer litigants were settling in federal courts in the
mid-sixties, Professor Carrington has suggested that the addition of many new federal
judgeships cut into the backlog of cases temporarily, diminishing the pressure to settle.
Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeal: The Threat to the Function of
Review and the NationalLaw, 82 HAxv. L. REv. 542, 545 (1969).
11. Business and consumer class actions have a much greater potential for unmanageability than civil rights or environmental class actions, for example, because the
latter are usually injunctive suits which do not involve the assessment of damages on
behalf of large numbers of people. Cf. Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App.
3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (2d Dist. 1971).
12. The author does not suggest that the American system of private law is without fault. Nearly seventy years ago, Dean Pound shocked the profession by denouncing
its unwillingness to discard the adversary system, "the sporting theory of justice." Pound,
The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 8 BAYLOR L.
REv. 1, 14 (1956). There may very well be something to be said for such a radical departure from the adversary system. See EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOXNALYTIc JURISPRUDENCE
259-81 (1971); Cappelletti, Social and Political Aspects of Civil Procedure-Reforms
and Trends in Western Europe, 69 MiCII. L. REv. 874 (1971); Kaufman, The Philosophy of Effective Judicial Supervision over Litigation, 29 F.R.D. 191, 207 (1962). However, judicial reshaping in the class action field is proceeding without recognition or
study of its impact on the American system. Worse is that these changes are occurring
under the ruse of strengthening the adversary system. See generally Louisell, Miller &
West, Comments on Vasquez v. Superior Court, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1042, 1056 (1971).
13. See note 11 supra.
14.
In the past few years, complaints have been filed on behalf of all consumers
of gasoline in a given state or states, all homeowners in the United States, and
even all persons in the United States. The class action has been hailed as "one
of the most socially useful remedies in history," a device which will open up the
federal courts to literally millions of small claimants. A similar attitude is reflected in the consumer protection bill which was recently reported by the
Senate Commerce Committee which adopts the class action as the apparent
panacea for all consumer grievances. A wave of emotionalism has been generated, with the result that anyone who does not enthusiastically endorse consumer class suits becomes an enemy of progress and a disciple of the devil.
Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The
Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUmn. L. Rzv. 1, 6 (1971) (footnotes and
citations omitted).
A class action brought on behalf of plaintiff "and all other possessors of real prop-
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ago as a device which would make the federal courts more efficient, 15
has instead mired those courts in complicated and protracted litigation. This situation has led one federal judge to conclude that "unless
prudence and caution are exercised soon by the bench and the bar, the
class action device can be transformed from a useful tool to an engine
of destruction." 16 Chief Judge Lumbard of the Second Circuit, lodging
a bitter dissent in the famous case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
wrote:
Class actions were not meant to cover situations where almost everybody is a potential member of the class. Nor were they even intended
to compel any court to entertain an alleged controversy with so many
potential parties, or to compel any court to entrust the interests of
numerous plaintiffs to representation by one plaintiff whose interest
is all of $70. [We must] put an end to this Frankenstein monster
posing as a class action7
Most class actions which are fortunate enough to come to a conclusion 18 result in miniscule recoveries to the relatively few plaintiffs who
finally file claims, 19 although attorneys on both sides often do very
erty in, and residents of, the County of Los Angeles" was dismissed because of a lack of
community of interest among the class members and the action's unmanageability. Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 376, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (2d

Dist. 1971).
15. See, e.g., Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23,
43 F.R.D. 39 (1967); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARv. L. REV. 356 (1967); Wright,
Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169 (1968). But Professor Wright has also written that if a
liberal interpretation of rule 23 "encourage(s] courts to allow maintenance of class actions in controversies that are unmanageable by this device, the rule may come into
disrepute even for the cases to which it is well suited." Id. at 171.
16. Smith v. Beneficial Fin. Co., Civil No. 860-71 (D.N.J., July 23, 1971).
17. 391 F.2d 555, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting) [hereinafter cited as Eisen II].
The Eisen case has occupied the courts for the past seven years: 41 F.R.D. 147
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Eisen I], aff'd, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967), revd and remanded, Eisen II, rehearing 50 F.R.D. 471
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Eisen III], rehearing 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) [hereinafter cited as Eisen IV], rehearing 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Eisen V], rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Eisen VI], en banc hearing denied, (2d Cir. May 24, 1973), in N.Y.L.J., May 25, 1973,
p. 3, col. 3, cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973) (No. 203).
18. More than 53 percent of the class actions commenced in the southern district
of New York in the last six months of 1966 were still pending in December, 1971.
AmERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND REcoM.ENDATIONS OF THE SPE-

CIAL COMMITTEE ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
[hereinafter cited as ACTL REPORT].

13 (1972)

19. In Grossman v. Playboy Clubs Int'l, Inc., Civil No. 882939 (Super. Ct., L.A.,
Cal., Jan. 16, 1969), a class action brought on behalf of 460,000 lifetime members of the
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well.2 0 Furthermore, many successful consumer and shareholder class

actions will require individual actions to adjudicate damage and reli21
ance issues.
With its decisions in Vasquez v. Superior Court22 and La Sala v.
American Savings & Loan Association,23 the California Supreme Court
has followed the winding and bumpy class action road created by the
federal judiciary, where ethical considerations, court congestion, due
process violations, and disguised substantive law alterations may hope24
lessly entrap plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts themselves.

Playboy Club in California, the court permitted a settlement which provided each member $8 worth of expenses at the Playboy Club and $275,000 to the attorney, who happened to be the named plaintiff.
In another recent case under the shareholders' derivative rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1,
it has been estimated that after deducting the $1,250,000 attorney fee, from the
$5,000,000 settlement, victorious shareholders will receive approimately $0.02 per share.
Newman v. Stein, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,316 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 1971).
Even in the renowned case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, Eisen I-VI, which
has been pending in the southern district of New York since 1966 and has been immortalized in at least six pretrial written opinions, the named plaintiff alleges 'damages to himself of only $70.00. It has been estimated that the average recovery in that
suit brought on behalf of 6,000,000 odd-lot traders would be $3.90 (treble damages).

ACTL

REPORT

14-15.

Two notable exceptions to the miniscule recovery category are West Virginia v.
Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), and Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,
67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). In Pfizer, the district court
accepted a proposed compromise to settle 66 civil class actions claiming that the defendant had violated antitrust laws in the sale of antibiotics. In Daar, the settlement
was not refunded to cab users but was applied as a "fluid recovery" to lower Yellow
Cab's fares-certainly not a horrible fate in a competitive market. Considering the
driving habits of Southern Californians, it is probable that few individuals will "recover" more than a miniscule amount through the fare reductions. It is amusing that
many attorneys will benefit from the fare reductions, however, since taxi transportation
is the favorite mode of travel between downtown Los Angeles offices and the county
courthouse. The plaintiff-attorney in Daar received approximately $250,000 in fees.
20. See note 18 supra. Since many class actions are brought against large corporations, it is safe to assume that lawyers defending such corporations in prolonged litigation receive their customary fees.
21. See generally text accompanying notes 65-93, 108-19 infra.
22. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
23. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
24. Even Professor Louisell, a strong proponent of expanded class actions offered
the lyrical caveat, in an article which he co-authored, that
[i]n the hands of those judges who are heedless of the shoals of legislative or
even constitutional restraints, and who are overly eager to jump aboard flimsy
crafts provided that they be thought to be headed for the waves of the future,
the class suit can be a dangerous means to a due processless end ...
. . . Great tyrannies could be worked in Ecology's or Consumers', no less
than in Liberty's name.
Loisell, Miller & West, supra note 12, at 1064. This author believes we are much closer
to those due processless ends and great tyrannies than Professor Louisell supposed.

607

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

After analyzing class actions in the federal system and in California, this article recommends certain legislative and judicial measures which should be taken in order to protect the class action and
to prevent its abuse.
I. EXPANSION OF

THE CLAss

ACTION DEVICE

A. Federal Law
1. Old Rule 23 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure.
The basic philosophy of class actions has remained unchanged
through the centuries. .

.

. Class actions were known to English

chancery practice since the 17th century. They developed as an exception to the broad and flexible equity rule that all persons materially
interested in the subject of the litigation should be joined as parties.... Notwithstanding its departure from the more traditional no-

tions of procedural due process, the class action device found ready
acceptance in the United States. 25
Borrowing from English chancery, early American decisions accepted the class action in these equity cases where absent parties necessarily would be bound by judgments. 2 1 A series of equity rules2 preceded rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the jurisdictional bases for class actions in federal courts.
The states which adopted the Field Code generally promulgated
the rule that when parties were united in interest and
where the question is one of a common or general interest of
many persons, or where the parties are very numerous and it may
be impracticable to bring them all before28the court, one or more may
sue or defend for the benefit of the whole.
For more than 100 years, state courts grappled with the question:
When are parties united in interest? Stressing the equity history of
representative actions, the courts usually answered this question by
25. Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUix. L. Rv.
609, 610-11 (1971) (footnotes omitted). For a thorough historical analysis of the development of class actions in the English Court of Chancery, see Sineone, Class Suits
Under the Codes, 7 W. REs. L. Rnv. 5 (1955).
26. Homburger, supra note 25, at 611.
27. E.g., Eq. R. 38, 226 U.S. 659 (1912).
28. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 1005 (McKinney 1963) (identical in substance to the
Field Code of 1848).
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allowing class actions only when the relationships among the parties
were such that a judgment for or against one party would bind or
reward an absent party.
Rule 23, adopted in 1938, authorized class actions
when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against
the class is
(1) joint or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner
of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of
the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of
claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the
action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact
affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.29
The suits permitted by rule 23 became known, respectively, as "true,"
"hybrid," and "spurious" class actions. In the "true" class action, every
member of the class was bound by the judgment. Members of the
class were bound in the hybrid suit "only as to rights, if any, in the
property involved." 30 The spurious class action was an anomaly because
it was interpreted to be no more than a permissive joinder device s '
and "it was supposed not to adjudicate the rights or liabilities of any
person not a party."3 2 Although Professor Moore, draftsman of the
original rule 23, intended a limited use of the spurious action,33 a
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (1)-(3) (1938).
30. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 310 (1971).
31. See Carroll v. American Fed. of Musicians, 372 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1967) (decided under the old rule 23); Oppenheimer v. F. I. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d
Cir. 1944).
32. Advisory Committee's Notes, ProposedRules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 98,
99 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Notes].
33. According to Professor Homburger:
The "spurious" class suit was intended merely as a device to facilitate permissive
joinder of members who were not originally named as representatives of the
class. As drafted by Professor Moore, the rule would have provided that, absent
collusion, only the citizenship of the original parties should be considered where
jurisdiction is founded upon diversity of citizenship. However, the Advisory
Committee did not consider it proper to deal with these matters in the rule.
The result was a truncated rule which established the three Moore categories,
but said nothing about either subject matter jurisdiction or the effect of the
judgment. The federal courts, however, generally accepted the draftsman's
point of view and construed the rule in accordance with his intent.
Homburger, supra note 25, at 627-28. But for the view that the "spurious" action was
applied in situations not contemplated in the original draft, see notes 24-36 infra &
accompanying text.
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few federal and some state courts which had adopted the language
of the federal rule extrapolated several class benefits from the otherwise innocuous subdivision (3)action. These courts tolled the statute
of limitations at the time a spurious suit was commenced, and thus
permitted the subsequent joinder of parties who would otherwise have
been barred by the statute. 34 Some courts even permitted one-way
intervention, which allowed class members to join the suit after a favorable judgment. 35 This procedure bestowed upon potential class
members the luxury of avoiding the costs of a losing suit while simultaneously preventing collateral estoppel on behalf of the party oppos36
ing the class.
Under the Field Code and the old federal equity rule, decisions
were often concerned with whether a judgment would have a binding
effect on absent parties. This concern continued under the 1938 rule,
but the courts soon became confused about the meanings of "joint,
or common, or secondary" rights, 37 as well as the meanings of "several"
rights in "specific property, ' 38 and "several" rights in a common "question of law or fact." 39 The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966
amendments to rule 23 indicate that this confusion was one of the
reasons for amending the rule.40 As Professor Wright has said:
If matters of importance turn on the classification given a particular
suit, then it is vital that it be clearly understood which classification
applies. The fact was that the task of determining which label was
appropriate for a particular suit "baffled both courts and com41
mentators."
34. See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 569 (10th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 801 (1962); Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some
Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 433 (1960). Contra, Weeks v. Bareco
Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941) (dictum).
35. See York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 529 (2d Cir. 1945), rev'd on
other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.
1957); Hormel v. United States, 17 F.R.D. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See also Kalven &
Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684
(1940); Starts, The Consumer Class Action, 49 B.U.L. REv. 407, 467-69 (1969); Comment, The Spurious Class Suit: Procedural and Practical Problems Confronting Court
and Counsel, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 630-33 (1958).
36. Unlike most other jurisdictions which adopted the federal rule of 1938,
Missouri courts collaterally estopped nonparties from bringing new actions if a previous
spurious class action had been decided against the previous party-plaintiff. See Starrs,
supra note 35, at 467-68.
37. FED.R. Cxv. P. 23(a) (1) (1938).

38. Id. (a) (2).
39. Id. (a) (3).
40. Advisory Committee Notes 98-100.
41. C. WRIGHT, supra note 30, at 311 (footnotes omitted).
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Since absent parties were bound not merely by decree of the court
but by the very nature of the plaintiff's or defendant's judgment, one
would have expected adequacy of representation to be of paramount
interest in class actions. Surprisingly, neither the pre-1938 Field Codes
nor the federal decisions concerned themselves with that issue. Perhaps it was assumed that no party would bring or defend an action
without using his best efforts. The 1938 rule recognized the problem
and required that the party or parties allegedly representing the class
do so adequately. 42 The adequacy of the representation provision rule
43
was tested within two years in the case of Hansberry v. Lee.
The petitioner in Hansberry asked the Supreme Court to declare
a racially restrictive land covenant invalid on the ground that the
covenant had not been approved by 95 percent of the landowners in
the concerned tract as required by the terms of the covenant before it
could become operative. The Supreme Court of Illinois had refused
petitioner relief because it felt bound by a stipulation in a previous
but related case 44 that the 95 percent requirement had been met, although the court admitted that the earlier stipulation was factually erroneous. 45 In challenging the Illinois decision, petitioner alleged that
he and his class were denied due process of law under the fourteenth
amendment 46 because the plaintiff in the earlier case, in agreeing with
the 95 percent stipulation, had prevented the petitioner's class from
litigating that issue.
Because the Hansberry case was brought under Illinois' class action procedures, the United States Supreme Court did not identify
whether the action was "true," "hybrid," or "spurious." The Court
concluded, however, that the Illinois Supreme Court had violated
petitioner's due process rights by accepting the earlier stipulation.
The Court found that the interests of the earlier plaintiffs were not
42. "If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable
to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure
the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(a) (1938).
43. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). See Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33
CORNELL L.Q. 327 (1948).
44. Burke v. Kleinman, 277 Ill. App. 519 (1st Dist. 1934)
45. Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37 (1939), rev'd, 311 U.S. 32
(1940). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed its circuit's finding that, in fact, only
54 percent of the landowners had signed. 372 InI. at 372, 24 N.E.2d at 38.
46. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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the same as those of the petitioner and his class and, therefore, the
earlier plaintiffs had not adequately represented them:
Because of the dual and potentially conflicting interests of those
who are putative parties to the agreement in compelling or resisting
its performance, it is impossible to say, solely because they are parties
to it, that any two of them are of the same class. Nor without more,
and with the due regard for the protection of the rights of absent
parties which due process exacts, can some be permitted to stand in
judgment for all. 47
By affirming the principle of adequacy of representation and by giving
it constitutional stature, the Supreme Court created a new problem
-with which rule 23 did not deal: the adequacy of notice. 4 If class
members had the constitutional right to be adequately represented,
then surely they had a constitutional right to be notified of the
pendency of a class action so that they might contest the representation
or intervene. The constitutional right to notice was recognized in
Mullane v. CentralHanover Bank & Trust Co.,49 where the Court held

that a trustee had a duty to personally notify beneficiaries when the
law required notice and that published notice was not acceptable if
the beneficiaries' addresses were known. The Court did not say when
notice itself was required of the pendency of a class action.r0
The 1938 rule required that notice be sent of any proposed dismissal or compromise of a "true" class action but gave the court discretion whether to order notice of dismissal or compromise in "hy47. 311 U.S. at 44.
48. Advisory Committee Notes 99.
49. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
50. Professor Homburger, disagreeing with most commentators, views Mullane
within the limited context of its facts:
The court [in Mullane] lacked adjudicatory authority unless it acquired
jurisdiction over each trust beneficiary....
The situation in class actions is different. Notice is not needed to vest
the court with adjudicatory jurisdiction over the absent members of the
class. . . . [They will be bound only if . . . adequately represented by the
champions of the common cause.
Homburger, supra note 25, at 645. Professor Homburger's narrow interpretation would
seem to imbue trial courts with omniscience, enabling them to judge adequacy of representation in class actions without notifying those who may be able to offer evidence
on that issue. Unnotified class members may raise the adequacy issue after an adverse judgment-if they have learned of the judgment. However, it would seem obvious
that any court would be reluctant to reverse an adequacy finding after spending years
litigating the merits of the case.
In the most recent and definitive of the many opinions in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, the Second Circuit interpreted notice to all known class members as constitutionally mandated. Eisen VI 1015.
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brid" or "spurious" class actions. 51 Such a rule recognized the collusive
potential of settlements in class actions where alleged representatives
might accept a settlement which bound class members to a miniscule
recovery (or a large liability) but which offered the representative a
handsome fee. However, the courts and the draftsmen did not appear
to view rule 23 (e) as a method of curtailing strike suits brought for
their nuisance value in the hope of forcing settlement.
Aware of the problems of categorizing actions and judgments, 52
of determining adequate representation and of requiring notice, the
Supreme Court accepted the amendments proposed by the Judicial
Conference in 1966.r,
2. New Rule 23 and Its Application. In subdivision (a), the new
rule sets out four criteria that all class actions must meet:
(1) the class must be "so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable,"
(2) there must be "questions of law or fact common to the class,"
(3) "the claims or defenses of the representative parties" must be
"typical of the claims or defenses of the class," and
(4) "the representative parties" must "fairly and adequately pro' 54
tect the interests of the class."
The general criteria of subdivision (a) identify the requirements which
courts, often unwittingly, had read into the old rule 23. Of course,
language such as "common questions of law or fact" is subject to
varying interpretations.
51. FED.R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1938):
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of
the court. If the right sought to be enforced is one defined in paragraph (1) of
subdivision (a) of this rule, notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall
be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. If
the right is one defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice
shall be given only if the court requires it.
52. "The principal reason for rewriting rule 23 in 1966 was to get away from
the conceptionally-defined categories of the old rule." C. WRIGHT, supra note 30, at
311. Professor Wright's statement underscores the draftsman's and the committee's desire to clearly define how and when a class action could be brought. It is not clear
that the purpose of the revisions was to increase the number of class actions brought
by making them more accessible to litigants. This is contrary to some contemporary
opinion. E.g., Eisen II; Kaplan, supra note 15, at 356. But see Eisen VI.
53. Justice Black dissented in the adoption of the amendments, claiming that they
gave the trial court too much discretion in accepting or denying class action status.
Mr. Justice Black's statement, 39 F.R.D. 272, 274 (1966).
54. F: . R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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Subdivision (b) of the new rule defines the three types of class
actions which may be brought. Although there are some similarities
between the (b) definitions and the three categories under the old
rule, the new rule does away with the "specific property" requirement
of the hybrid action,5 5 combines and more precisely defines what were
formerly true and hybrid actions, 6 creates a specific class action for
injunctive relief,5 7 and eliminates the spurious action. The spurious
action has been replaced by the (b)(3) action in which the court may
permit a class action only when "the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and [when] a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy."58 Class actions brought since 1966 have almost all been
(b)(3) actions, and it is those actions which this paper will critically
discuss.
Subdivision (c)(1) of the new rule requires a determination "[a]s
soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as
a class action, [whether the action may] be so maintained." Because of
the extensive notice requirements of rule 23, Judge Weinstein, in
Dolgow v. Andersonr0 was concerned with the effect and costs of an
erroneous decision permitting a class action to proceed. Therefore,
before notifying potential class members, he ordered a "mini-hearing,"
purportedly under rule 23(c)(1), to determine the probable merits of
the class action. A few courts accepted Judge Weinstein's innovation,0 0
though many rejected it as improper under the statute."' The Second
55. Id. (b) (1).
56. Id.
57. Id. (b) (2).
58. Id. (b) (3).
59. 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
60. Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), appeal dismissed, 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971). Several California Supreme Court cases have
recommended that federal class action procedures be followed in the absence of controlling California statutes. La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 872,
489 P.2d 1113, 1117, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 853 (1971); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4
Cal. 3d 800, 821, 484 P.2d 964, 977, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 809 (1971); Daar v. Yellow
Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 742, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 734 (1967). The
class action manual recently adopted by the Los Angeles County Superior Courts requires such pretrial merit hearings for all class actions. MANUAL FOR THE CONDUCT OF
PRETRIAL HEARINGS ON CLASS ACTION ISSUES OF THE

Los

ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

(1973).
61. Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971); Gosa v. Securities
Inv. Co., 449 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1971); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, Glen Alden Corp. v. Kahan, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Katz v. Carte Blanche

614

CLASS ACTIONS

Circuit recently held that federal courts have no jurisdiction to hold
62
mini-hearings on the merits.
Under subdivision (c)(2) "the best notice practicable" of the
pendency of a (b)(3) class action is to be sent to class members, 63 "including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort. ' 6 4 Subdivision (c)(2) further provides that such notice shall inform the class member that he will be included in the
class and will be bound by the judgment unless he requests exclusion
from the class by a specified date. This type of notice has become
known as "opt-out" notice and will be discussed in detail below.
Subdivision (e) repeats the old rule's command that class members must be notified of a proposed dismissal or compromise. The new
rule, however, requires such notice for all three types of class actions,
whereas the old rule made such notice mandatory only in "true" class
actions.
One of the most frequently cited cases decided under new rule
6 5 which
23 is Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
arose under the Sherman
Corp., 52 F.R.D. 510 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Fogel v. Wolfgang, 47 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y 1969); Cannon v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 47 F.R.D. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Mersay v. First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D.

465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
62. Eisen VI 1016.

63. There has been some dispute whether notice of (b) (1) and (b) (2) actions
must be provided to class members. Some courts have said that notice in such actions
is discretionary. See, e.g., Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co. 54 F.R.D. 465 (W.D. Pa.
1972). Others have said that due process requires notice, although the trial court may
determine the type (published or mailed) and form ("opt-in" or "opt-out") of notice.
See, e.g., Eisen II 564 (dictum). It is not clear whether the Second Circuit would uphold this dictum in light of its latest Eisen decision. Eisen VI 1015.
64. The clear language of (c) (2) was not followed by the district court in Eisen,
Eisen IV, where Judge Tyler ordered that individual notice be sent to 5,000 class members picked randomly from an alleged class of 2,000,000. The remaining 1,995,000 class
members whose names were known were to receive notice through publication, not only
a statutory violation but probably a constitutional one. See Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See also note 50 supra & accompanying text. Judge
Tyler, who had originally ruled against class action status, Eisen I, believed he was
compelled by the following holding of the circuit court to consider notice by publica-

tion: "Without an evidentiary hearing we do not see how this question [of notice by
publication] can be answered." Eisen II 369. Because the class was so immense, Judge
Tyler ordered published notice. The Second Circuit, faced with a growing number of

class actions since 1968, rebuked Judge Tyler for misinterpreting its earlier decision,

and it held that
[i]f identification of any number of members of the class can readily be made,
individual notice to these members must be given and Eisen must pay the cost.
If this cannot be done, the case must be dismissed as a class action.
Eisen VI 1015. In view of the tone and language of the circuit court's earlier opinion,
one must sympathize with Judge Tyler.
65. Eisen I-VI.
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Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1984. Plaintiff brought the
action on6 behalf
of himself and all other purchasers and sellers of
"odd-lots" 6 on the New York Stock Exchange, alleging that the defendant brokerage firms had combined and conspired to monopolize
the odd-lot trading market and "had fixed the odd-lot differential at
an excessive amount .... ,,67 Plaintiff also claimed that the defendant
New York Stock Exchange breached its duties under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.68 District Judge Tyler, in the first Eisen case,00
dismissed the class action, finding that the common issues did not predominate over the individual ones. Judge Tyler based that finding on
the following facts: First, plaintiff made no compelling showing that
he qualified as an adequate representative of the class. The opinion
noted that more is needed than a mere allegation that one's attorneys
are "well-qualified antitrust specialists." A class of possibly hundreds
of thousands of members should not be represented by only one plaintiff who has not pleaded with particularity the details of his injury nor
has estimated the value of his loss. 70 Second, the "most serious difficulty" would be notifying such a large class of the pendency of the
action. Questioning the constitutionality of notice to the class members by publication, the court saw the cost of individually notifying
each class member 7' as an inherent limitation on the action.7 2 Judge
Tyler believed that the plaintiff's concept of legally sufficient notice of
a class action was so strained that it
raises the suspicion, which may or may not be justified, that [plaintiff,
an attorney,] is more interested in notice for the sake of undesirable
solicitation of claims than for proper protection of the interests of the
other members of the class ....

3

66. An odd-lot transaction is one involving less than 100 shares. The odd-lot differential is a charge in addition to the brokerage fee which the customer pays to the
broker because it is apparently more costly to buy and sell small amounts of stock.
See Eisen II 559.
67. Id.
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b), (d), s(a) (1970).
69. Eisen I.
70. "Plaintiff in his papers gives no compelling reasons and alleges no facts to
support the proposition that he can adequately protect the interests of possibly hundreds of thousands of members of the alleged class except to assert that both of his
lawyers are well-qualified antitrust specialists." Eisen I 150.
71. Eisen estimated there were at least 2,000,000 class members. In its most recent
opinion, the Second Circuit believed the class numbered 6,000,000. Eisen VI 1008.
72. Eisen I 151-52.
73. Id. at 152.
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In reversing over Chief Judge Lumbard's bitter dissent, the court
of appeals refuted each of Judge Tyler's reasons for denying the class
action. Since the court of appeals saw the class action as a "device for
vindicating claims which, taken individually, are too small to justify
74
legal action but which are of significant size if taken as a group," it

disagreed with Judge Tyler's finding that one plaintiff with an apparently small claim is unqualified to represent a large class. More is
needed to show inadequate representation than the small size of the
plaintiff's claim or the large size of the class. Furthermore, the failure
of absent class members to intervene in the litigation was cited as an
unpersuasive reason for finding a lack of common issues in the case.
Defendants had contended that an individual's reasons for trading in the market or his individual damage claims precluded a predominance of common issues among class members. The circuit court
disagreed, finding that "the alleged underlying conspiracy does contain a so-called 'common nucleus of operative facts,' "-1 and noting that
"after an initial finding of liability" individual damage claims of class
members might have to be handled in "individual suits for damages.,

76

The opinion advised the trial court that on remand it "should explore
the problems which individual class members would be likely to en77
counter in filing and proving their claims."
On remand, Judge Tyler conducted a Dolgow v. Anderson "minihearing" 78 and responded to what seemed to be the Second Circuit's
clear desire to give Eisen's action class status. After holding that personal notice of the action need only be sent to a random sample of
the class members, 79 he held that since the class was more likely than
not to prevail the defendant must pay 90 per cent of the costs of notifying the class.80 Judge Tyler admitted that notice might not reach all
74. Eisen II 563, quoting Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1966).
75. Eisen II 566.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 567.
78. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
79. Eisen IV 267-68. Judge Tyler's notice plan contains the following elements:
(1) Notice would be sent to all member firms of the New York Stock Exchange and
to all commercial banks with large trust departments; (2) notice would be sent to the
2,000 class members who had ten or more transactions during the relevant period; (3)
notice would be sent to 5,000 other class members of the 2,000,000, chosen on a random
basis; and (4) notice would be published once each month for two consecutive months

in the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, the San Francisco Chronicle and
Examiner, and the Los Angeles Times.
80. Eisen V 573.
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class members but found that his proposals would "increase the likelihood of reaching a significant portion of the class.""' The court's solution to the difficult notice problem was in obvious conflict with rule
2382 and so patently unfair to the defendant that it presented serious
83
substantive and procedural due process issues.
When Judge Tyler's decisions on remand were reviewed after five
years experience with "[c]lass actions [which] have sprouted and multiplied like the leaves of the green bay tree."8 4 the same Second Circuit
panel reversed Judge Tyler, castigated him for misinterpreting its
earlier opinion, and dismissed the class action. The court held that
the Dolgow v. Anderson "mini-hearing," adopted by Judge Tyler, was
not authorized by rule 23 and that the district court, therefore, exceeded its jurisdiction by its
provisional or other makeshift determination of the issues ...on the
merits for the avowed purpose of deciding a collateral matter such as
which party is to be required to pay for mailing, publishing or otherwise giving any notice required by law. 8 ,

Insisting that its earlier opinion did not give Judge Tyler discretion to approve notice proposals when members of the class were easily
81. Eisen IV 267.
82. "Tjhe court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2).
83. Requiring defendant to pay the costs of notifying his adversaries of the action
against him when there is no hope of reimbursement even if victorious is unprecedented. Judge Tyler's decision to assess defendant 90 percent of the costs was arbitrary
and apparently based upon his belief that there was a substantial possibility that defendant was liable. Furthermore, a victorious defendant, after spending large sums notifying the class, would never be certain his victory was res judicata against most class
members, because they would still have the opportunity to show they did not receive
notice of the original action. Cf. Sertic v. International Bhd. of Carpenters, 459 F.2d
579 (6th Cir. 1972).
84. Eisen VI 1018.
85. Id. at 1015. The court stopped short of holding that the assessment of costs
of notice against defendant prior to judgment violated due process. However, the following language indicates the court was prepared to make such a holding:
It is a historical fact that procedural safeguards for the benefit of all litigants
constitute some of the most important and salutary protections against oppressions [citing the fifth amendment's due process clause], including oppressions
by those whose intentions may be above reproach.
Id. at 1013.
In most cases the so-called tentative findings and conclusions arrived at without the salutary safeguards applicable to all full scale trials on the merits will
be extremely prejudicial to one or the other of the parties who bear the brunt
of such findings and conclusions, and such prejudice may well be irreparable.
Id. at 1015.
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identified, the court held that rule 23 required individual notice to be
paid for by plaintiff. 86 Notice by publication, said the court, "[w]here
there are millions of dispersed and unidentifiable members of the
class . . . [is] a farce." 87 In what must be considered a complete re-

versal of its earlier interest in experimenting with class action procedures, the circuit court further held that the fluid recovery system, 8
whereby class members do not recover individually but supposedly
benefit through reduced rates in the future, was not authorized by
rule 2389 or by the due process clause. 90 The only permissible method
of distributing damages is to individual claimants. However, with the
six million potential claimants in Eisen there was little hope of efficiently proving claims. From another perspective, the court noted that
a monumental waste of judicial effort would occur if damages were
somehow assessed on behalf of six million members and only a relatively small number bothered to file claims. 91 For the foregoing reasons,
Chief Judge Lumbard's earlier view that the case was unmanageable
as a class action was belatedly, albeit reverently, accepted. 92
B. State Law-Californiaas a Model
Several recent California Supreme Court decisions are among the
most far-reaching class action experiments in the country. It is this
writer's opinion that attempts by state courts such as California's, to
mold the class action through case law into a device for vindicating
consumers' rights have been undertaken without due consideration of
many constitutional and procedural questions. Therefore, it is important to analyze several of these recent decisions.9 3
86. Id. at 1009, 1015.

87. Id. at 1017.
88. See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr.
724 (1967). See also West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), affd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971) (affirming fluid recoveries arising out of
settlements).
89. Eisen VI 1008.
90. Id. at 1013, 1015. The court did not explain why fluid recoveries violated
due process. Most likely it was felt that an award of damages without proof of individual loss was constitutionally impermissible.
91. Id. at 1012. The obvious effect of such a poor class response was not discussed.
The class' attorneys, nonetheless, would receive contingency fees based upon the overall
assessment of damages and not merely on the small amount claimed by members.
92. Id. at 1016.
93. The reader who is interested in pursuing more fully the history of the development of class actions in California should study the following cases: La Sala v.
American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971);
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1. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.9 4 Daar was decided pursuant to sec-

tion 382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure which provides
in pertinent part that
[w]hen the question is one of a common or general interest, of many
persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impractical to
bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for
the benefit of all.95
The statute makes no express mention of "class actions," but it has
been interpreted to permit them "upon the equitable doctrine of
virtual representation." 9 6 Prior to Daar,this statute had been held to
require (1) an ascertainable class and (2) a "well defined community
of interest in the questions of law and fact involved . . .,9T
In Daar, plaintiff brought an action for damages on behalf of
himself and all users of Yellow Cabs in Los Angeles, alleging that defendant's meters were set in such a manner as to charge passengers
more than the rate set by the Los Angeles Public Utilities Commission. In an opinion which ushered in the new era of class actions in
California, the supreme court overruled a demurrer and permitted the
action to be brought. The court found it unnecessary to identify the
individual members of the class or to isolate a common recovery fund;
it stated that class members need only come forward to prove individual claims if the liability of the defendant was established.98 As a
Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971);
Gerhard v. Stephans, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 442 P.2d 692, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1968); Daar
v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967); Chance
v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 275, 373 P.2d 849, 23 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1962); Weaver
v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Ass'n, 32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 (1948); Slakey
Bros. Sacramento, Inc. v. Parker, 265 Cal. App. 2d 204, 71 Cal. Rptr. 269 (3d Dist.
1968).
94. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
95.

CAL. CxV. PRo.

CODE

§ 382

(West 1973).

96. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 703, 433 P.2d 732, 739, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 724, 731 (1967).
97. Id. at 704, 433 P.2d at 739, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
98. Id. at 706, 433 P.2d at 740, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 732. Later in the opinion, the
court recognized that most taxi users' claims would be small and users would have no
receipts to prove damages. However, the court remarked that
[a]ssuming [the exact amount of overcharge is known to the defendant and
can be ascertained therefrom], as we must here [on a demurrer review], no
appearance by the individual members of the class will be required to recover
the full amount of the overcharges in each count.
Id. at 716, 433 P.2d at 747, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
The Second Circuit held the "fluid recovery" system prophesized in Daar to be
Megal under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, apparently, unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Eisen VI.
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corollary to its decision that a common fund was unnecessary for recovery, the court ruled that "a common recovery [is not needed] in
order to establish a community of interest." 99 It indicated that the
only purpose of a common recovery requirement would be to insure
fair representation of the class-an issue a court could decide without
the presence or absence of a common fund. 00
As a result of Daar,the requirement of an ascertainable class was
merged with the requirement that there exist a "community of interest among the class members in the questions of law and fact involved."'' 1 In other words, once the court finds a community of interest among certain parties, it necessarily will have ascertained the
class.
In reaching its results, the Daar court applied a balancing test,
weighing the advantages and disadvantages to the litigants and to the
court of permitting a class action:
As we are not unmindful that substantial benefits resulting from class
litigations, both to the litigants and to the court, should be found
before the imposition of a judgment binding on absent parties can be
justified, our determination depends upon whether the common questions are sufficiently important to permit adjudication in a class action
rather than in a multiplicity of separate suits. 102
The court then proceeded to balance the following issues: (1)
whether, absent a class suit, "a multiplicity of legal actions dealing
with identical basic issues will be required in order to permit recovery
by each of several thousand taxicab users";'103 (2) whether, "absent a
10 4
class suit, recovery by any of the individual taxicab users is unlikely,'
due to the small value of each individual claim; and (3)whether,
"absent a class suit, defendant will retain the benefits from its alleged
wrongs"'- 0 5-a type of unjust enrichment theory.
Unfortunately, the court's balancing test does not ask the trial
court to consider whether a class action, though desirable to the plaintiffs, might be so large and complex as to be burdensome and unmanageable to the court . 0° 6 Nor were procedural and constitutional
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

67 Cal. 2d at 707, 433 P.2d at 741, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
Id. at 710, 433 P.2d at 743, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
Id. at 710-13, 433 P.2d at 743-45, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 735-37.
Id. at 713, 433 P.2d at 745, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
Id. at 714-15, 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
Id. at 715, 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
7d.
See Eisen I-VI.
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problems of notice considered. Nevertheless, the California Supreme
Court made it clear that with "proper" notice, the judgment in Daar
would be binding upon absent class members and preclude any further
07
actions against defendant arising from the same facts.
2. Vasquez v. Superior Court.0 8 In Vasquez, the supreme court
was squarely faced with the question whether "a group of consumers
who [had] bought merchandise under installment contracts [could]
maintain a class action seeking rescission of the contracts for fraudulent misrepresentation on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated ... .",,o Thirty-seven named plaintiffs brought the action on
behalf of themselves and others who purchased frozen food and freezers from one of the defendants. The complaint alleged that all of the
class members had signed identical contracts creating a community of
interest which bound the class members. The crucial problem was
whether the individual issues of reliance and misrepresentation were
peculiar to each class member and thus predominant. The supreme
court overruled the lower courts' sustaining of the demurrer and permitted the class action to proceed.
At the outset, the court considered policy reasons for giving as
much leeway as possible to the maintenance of consumer class actions.
Since only "informed, sophisticated" consumers understand their rights
in business transactions-including the purchase of necessary products
-"
[p]rotection of unwary consumers from being duped by unscrupulous sellers is an exigency of the utmost priority in contemporary society." 110
The opinion stressed the importance of deterring potential
sellers from cheating and exploiting the consumer."' In addition, it
was noted, that a consumer class action produces the "salutary byproducts" of "aid[ing] legitimate business enterprises by curtailing illegitimate competition, and . . . [of assisting] the judicial process [by
eliminating] the burden of multiple litigation involving identical
claims."112
107. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704-06, 433 P.2d at 739-40, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 731-32.
108. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
109. Id. at 805, 484 P.2d at 966, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 798. Another issue not pertinent
here was whether the class action for misrepresentation could be brought against the
finance company to whom the installment contracts had been assigned.
110. Id. at 808, 484 P.2d at 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 808, 484 P.2d at 968-69, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01.
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Plaintiffs alleged that defendant's salesmen memorized a standard
statement which was recited from memory to each member of the
class. The court held that
[i]f plaintiffs can prove their allegations at the trial, an inference that
the representations were made to each class member would arise, in
which case it would 'be unneccessary to elicit the testimony of each
plaintiff as to whether the representations were in fact made to
him." 3
Had the food and freezer sales promotion been conducted strictly
through the use of printed material, such as brochures or mailers, the
notion that individual proof of misrepresentation is unnecessary would
be logical. Although the cases arising under federal securities laws
were not cited, they arguably provide some precedent for eliminating
proof of individual misrepresentation when promotions are based on
114
written statements.
It appears that the court's holding shifted the burden of proof:
once plaintiff showed that identical sales pitches were memorized, it
would become defendant's burden to prove that they were not repeated or that class members did not rely on the statements. However,
the opinion in Vasquez fails to provide any guidelines to the trial
court in the event one of the defendant's salesmen declares that, although he memorized the statement, he seldom recited it. Would such
a declaration defeat the inference of a common misrepresentation and
thus invalidate the class action at the pleading stage or would it be
mere evidence to be considered at the trial? And if the class members
do not appear before the court to dispute the salesman's testimony,
would such testimony be given conclusive weight?
Noting that "[t]he rule in this state and elsewhere is that it is
not necessary to show reliance upon false representations by direct
evidence,"' '1 the court cited Williston for the proposition that "[w]here
representations have been made in regard to a material matter and
action has been taken, in the absence of evidence showing the contrary, it will be presumed that the representations were relied on." 1 6
113. Id. at 812, 484 P.2d at 971, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
114. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dolgow, 43 F.R.D. 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Eisen I-VI.
It will be argued that while common misrepresentations may be inferred from written
statements, reliance on these statements cannot be presumed.
115. 4 Cal. 3d at 814, 484 P.2d at 972, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
116. Id. at 814, 484 P.2d at 972, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 804-05, citing 12 WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS § 1515 (3d ed. 1970).
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None of the cases cited for the rule that indirect evidence may raise
a presumption of reliance involved class actions. Assuming, arguendo,
that all salesmen uttered the same misrepresentations, purchase of a
product should not of itself raise a presumption that the purchaser
relied on the misrepresentation. Without having the class members
before the court, how can the defendant possibly rebut that presumption with evidence that particular class members did not rely on the
misrepresentations or would have bought the food and freezers anyway because they thought the transaction was beneficial despite the
misrepresentations? Defendants can take depositions from the apparently hundreds of unnamed class members, but with the subsequent
decision of Southern California Edison Co. v. Superior Court,"17 a
defendant cannot rely on plaintiff's attorney to produce an unnamed
plaintiff for deposition but must subpoena the unnamed plaintiff as
though he were a nonparty. 118 Furthermore, if defendant finds that one
or more of the unnamed parties did not rely on the misrepresentations
it would appear that it must continue to depose all unnamed plaintiffs with the hope of eliminating them from the class seriatim. This
situation might prolong the litigation indefinitely and would clog the
court with subpoenas and possibly motions to strike various un-named plaintiffs from the class. The desire of the court to evade the
realities of the misrepresentation and reliance elements of the case and,
instead, to focus on policy reasons for permitting the class action is
manifested by its statement that "[flrequently numerous consumers
are exposed to the same dubious practice by the same seller so that
proof of the prevalence of the practice as to one consumer would provide proof for all." 1 9
3. La Sala v. American Savings & Loan Association. 20 In this
case, plaintiffs brought a class action alleging that defendant's trust
deeds, which permitted defendant "to accelerate if the borrower execut[ed] a junior encumbrance on the secured property, constituted an
invalid restraint upon alienation."' 2' After the action was filed, de117. 7 Cal. 3d 832, 500 P.2d 621, 103 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1972).
118. Id. at 842-43, 500 P.2d at 627-28, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16. It is most
likely that Southern CaliforniaEdison would also rule out the more expedient discovery
tools of interogatories, requests for admission, and written deposition since these devices
may be addressed only to parties.
119. 4 Cal. 3d at 808, 484 P.2d at 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
120. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
121. Id. at 868, 489 P.2d at 1115, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
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fendant offered to waive the due-on-encumbrance clause in the named
plaintiffs' trust deeds. Although the record does not show that the
named plaintiffs accepted the tendered waiver, the trial court dismissed
the action holding that "by reason of this waiver the named plaintiffs
no longer represented the class." '-22 The court of appeals affirmed the
lower court. The class action issue before the supreme court was
whether defendant's grant of benefits to the named plaintiffs prior
to notification of the pendency of the class action made the named
plaintiffs ineligible to represent the class. 123 A subsidiary issue was
whether plaintiff's contention that the trust deeds were contracts of
adhesion precluded a class action because proof of the adhesive character of the trust deeds would require each borrower to take the witness stand.
At the outset the court emphasized that the trial court dismissed
the action merely because it had found the plaintiffs unqualified to
represent the class-not because a class action was improper in restraint on alienation and adhesion cases. By not discussing restraint on
alienation and adhesion problems in class actions, the court apparently
held, sub silentio, that class suits could be brought in those types of
cases. The Vasquez rationale that plaintiffs might be able to prove the
contracts were adhesive without bringing each borrower before the
court was reiterated in La Sala:
The terms of the trust deeds used by American and competitors are
matters of public record. Through the testimony of American's own
officers plaintiffs may be able to prove American's bargaining policy
24
and prowess relative to its borrowers.

While the issue of whom should bear the burden of proof may not be
a constitutional one, allowing "matters of public record" to be the
basis of a cause of action without offering the actual contracts into
evidence "may effectively deprive defendants of their rights to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses guaranteed by well_ established principles of procedural due process.' 2 5
122. Id.
123. The substantive issue before the court was whether the due-on-encumbrance
clause is an illegal restraint on alienation. On this issue, the court held that "whenever
the borrower's execution of a junior encumbrance does not endanger the lender's security," the due-on-encumbrance clause is unenforceable. Id. at 877, 489 P.2d at 1121,
97 Cal. Rptr. at 857 (emphasis in original).
124. Id.
125. Lobell, Comments on Vasquez v. Superior Court, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1042,
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The court observed that the trial court had not found plaintiffs
to be inadequate representatives at the time the action was filed.
Since a representative owes a fiduciary duty to his class, the court held
that a successful personal settlement on behalf of the representative
does not divest him of his responsibility to continue the action for the
class' benefit. Nevertheless, the case was remanded to the trial court to
determine whether the plaintiffs were capable of representing the
class. If the trial court finds that the plaintiffs were incapable of
adequately and fairly representing the class, it must allow amendment of the complaint. If, after amendment, fair and adequate representation is still lacking, the court must give notice to the class that
the action will be dismissed.
The named plaintiffs had encumbered their properties to the defendant six and eleven years, respectively, prior to the filing of the
suit. The complaint, however, was brought on behalf of those who had
encumbered within four years of the filing of the suit. The four year
limitation of the class was arbitrary, since the statute of limitations
did not begin running at the time the trust deeds were issued; it
commenced running at the time each borrower was threatened with
acceleration. 126 In limiting the class in such a manner, plaintiffs' attorney apparently copied the form of the Daar complaint. If the trial
court found that the plaintiffs were not proper representatives merely
because they were not members of the limited class, plaintiffs could
amend to extend the class. Such an amendment would be a tacit admission that at the outset plaintiffs were not members of the class they
sought to represent. That admission ought to prevent amendment and
require dismissal,127 but the court thought the class limitation was a
mere technical error. In any case, it observed that if the action were
dismissed, plaintiffs might bring a new action on behalf of an extended class. The court ignored the fact that its liberal allowance of
1052 (1971) (footnote omitted). Professor Lobell has reacted strongly to shifting of
the burden of proof in Vasquez:
Clearly, in suggesting that the falsity of a representation as to each member of the alleged class may be shown by introducing evidence that neither
relates nor is necessarily relevant to any one class member, the court has extended traditional concepts of proof.
Id. at 1050-51.
126. 5 Cal. 3d at 875, 489 P.2d at 1119-20, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 855-56.
127. "Dismissal for lack of a representative plaintiff constitutes, in substance, a
holding that the suit does not qualify as a class action; hence, notice of the dismissal
becomes unnecessary." Id. at 872-73, 489 P.2d at 1118, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
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amendment might save the action on behalf of class members who had
not relied on plaintiffs' class action and whose rights would have been
cut off by the running of the statute of limitations in the period be2
tween filing of the original action and filing of the new action.1 1
If the plaintiffs properly amend their complaint to include themselves within the class, the trial court could still rule that the benefits
offered to the plaintiffs preclude a finding of adequate and fair representation.
In making that determination, the trial court may take into account
that the named plaintiffs have already obtained their individual benefits from the action; plaintiffs who have nothing at stake often will not
devote sufficient energy to the prosecution of the action; further, the
receipt of benefits by the named plaintiffs may sometimes create a
conflict
of interest between the class and its would-be representa129
tives.
Those guidelines appear to give the trial court complete discretion in
deciding the representation issue, and it would not be surprising for
the trial court to dismiss the action on the ground that "the named
plaintiffs have already obtained their individual benefits from the
action"130-the very reason the action was originally dismissed. The
guidelines do not recognize, however, that in nearly every class action
it is not the named plaintiff but the attorney who is actually the class
representative. The named plaintiff is the vehicle through whom the
attorney gains the opportunity to recover for a class and generate a
hefty legal fee. The La Sala court's insistence that named plaintiffs
and not their attorneys be adequate representatives reveals the unstated fear that class action pleading must not be liberalized to the
extent that attorneys would be permitted to proceed without actual
plaintiffs. Such a holding would be a license for attorney solicitation
128. Cf. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969); Esplin v. Hirshi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 928 (1969); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962); Philadelphia Elec.
Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 275 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Comment, Class
Actions Under New Rule 23 and Federal Statutes of Limitation: A Study of Conflicting Rationales, 13 VILL. L. Rav. 370 (1968).
129. 5 Cal. 3d at 871-72, 489 P.2d at 1117, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 853; cf. Rothman v.
Gould, 14 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1541 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Richland v. Cheatham, 272
F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
130. 5 Cal. 3d at 871-72, 489 P.2d at 1117, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
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of class actions-a violation of various canons, 131 statutes, 132 and
precedents.

1 33

Unfortunately, the fear of solicitation conflicts with the most
startling holding in La Sala: If the trial court finds that the named
plaintiffs do not adequately represent the class, the court must notify
the class of the proposed dismissal. Citing by analogy Federal Rule
23(e) and California Civil Code section 1781(f), 134 the court noted that
defendants must not be permitted to avoid class actions merely by
settling with plaintiffs. Without that prohibition, defendants could
settle seriatim with any class members who joined the action and thus
avoid class litigation.
If defendant is permitted to succeed with such revolving door tactics,
only members of the class who can afford to initiate or join litigation
131. ABA CANONS

OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

No. 28, states in pertinent part:

It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer to bring a lawsuit, except
in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do
so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but is indictable
at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes
of action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit . . .
or to breed litigation by seeking out . . . those having any other grounds of
action in order to secure them as clients ....
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(1) prohibits a lawyer, who
in an unsolicited manner recommends that an individual should obtain counsel, from
representing that layman unless they are friends, relatives, or already have an attorneyclient relationship.
132. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6129 (West 1962) states:
Every attorney who, either directly or indirectly, buys or is interested in buying
evidence of debt or thing in action, with intent to bring suit thereon, is guilty
of a misdemeanor.
Cf. id. § 6152.
Rule 2, Rules of Professional Conduct, 1 Cal. 3d Rules 51-52 (1970) reads, in
part: "A member of the State Bar shall not solicit professional employment" by advertisement or otherwise.
133. See generally Millsberg v. State Bar, 6 Cal. 3d 65, 490 P.2d 543, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 223 (1971). An interesting twist to the class action/solicitation problem is found
in Collins v. Rocha, 7 Cal. 3d 232, 497 P.2d 225, 102 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972), where the
defendant contended that if the alleged class was ascertainable, plaintiff's counsel
should discover the names of the class members and join them as parties. The court
rejected that suggestion because of the "ethical inhibition upon solicitation of professional employment." Id. at 237 n.5, 497 P.2d at 227 n.5, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 3 n.5.
134. Consumer Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (f) (West 1973)
states:
A class action shall not be dismissed, settled, or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal, settlement, or compromise shall be given in such manner as the court directs to each member
who was given notice pursuant to subdivision (d) and did not request exclusion.
This Act also offers remedies to consumers for 16 enumerated deceptive business practices. Id. § 1770.
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will obtain redress; relief for even a portion of the class would compel
innumerable appearances by individual plaintiffs. 35
The court failed to consider the impact of its notice ruling on solicitation. Attorneys now may look for individuals who may be within
a potential class. Reluctant to become involved in complicated and

prolonged class litigation, these potential plaintiffs may tell the attorney that they wish merely to settle their own claims. The lawyer
could. bring a class action on behalf of his client and others, although
his client would have no interest in the class suit. He might then propose a modest or even generous settlement to the defendant on behalf

of his named client which would be accepted by both parties. 136 If the
trial court determined that the client did not adequately represent the

class, it would give notice to the class that dismissal is pending. Class
members would not have relied to their detriment on the filing of the
class action because they had not heard of the action before. Nevertheless, if one class member responded affirmatively to the notice, the
entire class would have the benefit of the class action originally cre-

ated by the attorney. 13 7 All of these class members would receive the
benefits of the tolling of the statute of limitations with the original

complaint, although they did not rely on its filing. It is an inescapable
conclusion that if a new named plaintiff came forward, he would be

the product of an action and settlement created and proposed by the
original plaintiff's attorney.
The court cited California Civil Code section 1781(f) and Fed135. 5 Cal. 3d at 873, 489 P.2d at 1118, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
136. Attorneys are obligated to perform the best possible service to their clients.
Nevertheless, the hypothetical settlement situation discussed in the text presents a
grand opportunity for some lawyers to evade their responsibilities to their named plaintiffs in the face of a potential class action pot of gold for themselves. One author has
stated that "perhaps the enthralling prospect of homing in on a large contingent fee
is sufficient temptation for some lawyers to abandon forever the opportunities their
clients once had to recover substantial fractions of their claims." Franks, Rule 23Don Quixote Has a Field Day: Some Ethical Ramifications of Securities Fraud Class
Actions, 46 CHr.-KENT L. Rav. 1, 3-4 (1969).
137. In effect, a bizarre combination of opt-out/opt-in notice would be created:
If one member opts in, the silence of the other members is presumed to be acquiescence
in the action. If no one opts in, the class members' silence will be construed as opting
out and their rights will be unaffected by dismissal of the action. It may be argued
with some seriousness that class members who do not affirmatively respond to the notice
should not be permitted to bring individual actions, since the purpose of the notice is
to save the class action, not to stir up litigation. Cf. Papilsky v. Barndt, 333 F. Supp.
1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.

1077 (1973).
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eral Rule 23(e) as authority for the proposition that the dismissal of
a consumer class action due to settlement of the named plaintiff's
claim may not be ordered without notification to the class. These two
statutes were considered because there existed no controlling California authority. 13 8 Even by analogy, however, section 1781(f) is inapposite because it orders notice of pending dismissal to class members
"who [were] given [previous] notice [of the action] and did not request exclusion."'13 9 Section 1781(f) would appear to support the view
that when class members have not been notified of the existence of a
40
class action, they need not be notified of its dismissal.1
Federal precedents under rule 23(e) are more in line with the
La Sala holding.141 In a very recent case, however, the United States
Supreme Court vacated judgment and remanded a class action to a
138. 5 Cal. 3d at 872, 489 P.2d at 1117, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 853; see Vasquez v.
Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 821, 484 P.2d 964, 977-78, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 809-10
(1971), for the proposition that the federal rule is to be utilized in the absence of
controlling California authority.
139. CAL. Civ. CoDn § 1781(f) (West 1973).
140. It is also provided that a class action may be maintained 30 days after
plaintiff has notified defendant of his and of his purported class' claims unless defendant shows he has corrected or offered to correct all of the alleged deceptive business practices. Id. § 1782. This section does not prevent the named plaintiff from
settling with the defendant, nor does it require the plaintiff to continue the class
action. The statute allows plaintiff to represent the class; it does not force him to do so.
Section 1782 shows that the legislature was more concerned with providing a tool to
allow the individual to settle and withdraw from the action than with forcing him to
proceed. Balancing the possibilities for collusion against the desire to provide individual
relief, the legislature decided to allow individual settlement and withdrawal as long
as the class has no notice of the pendency of the action. For a generally contrary view,
see Reed, Legislating for the Consumer: An Insider's Analysis of the Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, 2 PAc. L.J. 1 (1971).
141.
Although case authority is sparse, the rule appears to be that a suit filed
as a class action is "treated as such for purposes of dismissal or compromise,
until there is a full determination that the class action is not proper."... Thus,
the fact that a class action determination has not yet been made in this case
does not remove this proposed dismissal from the requirements of Rule 23(e).
Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481, 483 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (citations omitted).
See also Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (discussion of the
history of strike suits brought as class actions merely to coerce settlements). But see
note 140 supra for the view that CAL. CIV. CODE § 1782 (West 1973) legitimizes

strike suits in consumer deceptive practices cases.
An amusing but legally questionable case wherein old rule 23(c) was relied on
in an action which went to trial in 1967 is Daugherty v. Ball, 43 F.R.D. 329 (C.D.
Cal. 1967). In that case the court held that notice of dismissal was unnecessary because merger of the defendant corporation with another corporation mooted the action
on the merits. It is unfortunate that courts choose to misstate substantive law in order
to avoid class actions rather than to confront the procedural difficulties of class actions head-on.
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three-judge district court to determine if the grant of benefits to a
welfare claimant mooted a class action brought by that claimant for
alleged state violations of federal welfare hearing requirements. 14 Furthermore, the California Supreme Court's comparison of Civil Code
section 1781 (f) with rule 23(e) is highly questionable. 143 In Philadelphia
Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 4 4 cited in La Sala, the
district court faced the issue whether an action must be given retroactive class status to the time the action was filed for the purpose of
rule 23(e) notice. Several named plaintiffs in Anaconda settled their
claims before the class was notified of the action. Various parties to the
litigation wanted the court to approve the settlement with the named
plaintiffs only, so as to dismiss with prejudice class and individual
actions against the settling defendants. The court refused to grant dismissal with prejudice without first notifying the class, even though
the class had never received notice of the pendency of the action. The
distinction between Anaconda and La Sala is dear: In Anaconda the
defendants and settling plaintiffs asked the court to dismiss the action
with prejudice so the non-settling class members would be prevented
from bringing suit again. The proposed La Sala settlement waiver
was merely between the named plaintiffs and the defendant; dismissal with prejudice against the class was not requested.
According to the La Sala defendant's counsel, there are apparently
millions of outstanding encumbrances on which the American Savings
and Loan Association is trustee and beneficiary. 45 The cost of merely
producing a list of potential class members may be astronomical, without even considering the cost of actually mailing the notice. American
does not keep separate records of which trustors have been "threatened"
142. Indiana Employment Sec. Div. v. Burney, 409 U.S. 540 (1973) (per curiam).
By citing Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962), the Court implied that
when a named plaintiff's claim is mooted, the issue becomes whether that plaintiff has
standing to sue for the class. 409 U.S. at 542. No mention was made in Burney of
rule 23(e) notice of dismissal requirements nor was rule 23(a) (4) adequacy of representation discussed. By basing its remand on the standing question, the Court may be
signaling its desire to circumvent rule 23 and lower court decisions regarding settlement and dismissal of class actions.
143. Compare CAL. Civ. CODE § 1781(f) (West 1973), with FED. R. Civ. P.
23 (e). "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members
of the class in such manner as the court directs." Id. Note that rule 23(e) does not
limit notice of dismissal to those previously notified of the action.
144. 275 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
145. Information supplied by Professor John R. Hetland, counsel for American
Savings & Loan Association in the La Sala litigation.
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with enforcement of their due-on-encumbrance clauses or against whom
such clauses have actually been enforced. To obtain a list of potential class members it would be necessary to read every loan file dealing
with deeds outstanding at the time of suit or foreclosed or paid off in
the four years preceding the suit. Nevertheless, as was the case in the
other California decisions discussed above, the supreme court did not
order the trial court to include defendant's burden in the substantial
benefits balance.
The named plaintiffs in La Sala sued for compensatory and punitive damages as well as declaratory relief. The declaratory relief was
granted by holding that due-on-encumbrance clauses are invalid absent a showing that the security would be endangered without acceleration. The court was under no obligation to provide compensatory relief to those whose obligations were accelerated or altered prior to its
decision. Due-on-encumbrance clauses were traditional in the real
estate security business. The defendant could not have supposed they
were illegal and should not be forced to litigate damages for clauses
enforced years before, especially in the complicated setting of this class
action. In its drive to make the class action readily available against
corporate defendants, the court has rejected its role of a dispassionate
arbiter of legal rights and instead has become a consumer advocate.

II.

SOME RATIONALES FOR LIBERALIZATION REBUTTED

In recent years, a much needed awareness of consumer problems
has emerged in the United States. It is obvious that one of the tools
of "consumerism" is the class action. 140 However, in their drive to
make capitalism responsive to the public, the courts have gone far
beyond legislative intent without considering the consequences of the
widespread use of large class actions.
A. The Fallacy of Aiding the Small Claimant
The most often cited purpose for liberalizing class action requirements is the desire to aid the small claimant who would otherwise be
146. See Goldhammer, The Consumer Class Action in California, 45 L.A.B. BULL.
235 (1970) ; Reed, supra note 140; Starrs, supra note 35.
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unable to afford filing his own action.1 47 The Second Circuit, for example, said in its earlier Eisen opinion
we think it highly unlikely that any one potential plaintiff would
have sustained sufficient damages to warrant, as a practical matter,
individual prosecution of his claim. Thus the present case appears
to fall within that class of cases in which "the interests of individuals
in conducting separate lawsuits" are more "theoretic than practical"
since "the amounts at stake for individuals (are) * * * so small that
separate suits would be impracticable." This belief is reinforced by
the fact that there is no other pending litigation dealing with the subject matter of this suit. 48
In another case, the Second Circuit quoted a famous article which concluded that
the type of injury which tends to affect simultaneously the interest of
many people is also apt to involve immensely complex facts and intricate law, and redress for it is likely to involve
expense totally dis49
proportionate to any of the individual claims.-

In examining the validity of such an analysis, one might ask whether it
is not a mistake to allow a large class action where immensely complex
facts and intricate law are involved. The courts have constantly forgotten that complex fact issues are not avoided by permitting the large
class action: the day of reckoning will come when individual damage
claims are proffered. 150
The most obvious reply to the small claimant theory is that the
court is not providing a forum for the frustrated potential plaintiff,
but it is creating an unmanageable lawsuit where the small claimant
previously had no interest in suing.
Thus, when a multitude of small claimants who would not otherwise
sue become, willy-nilly, parties to the suit merely because they ignore
147. See, e.g., Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd,
456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972); Eisen II; Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 977 (1969); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539
(W.D. Pa. 1971); Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1969).
148. Eisen II 566-67 (citation omitted). It is quite amusing that in its recent
Eisen opinion, the same Second Circuit panel reinforced its finding that relatively few
of the 6,000,000 class members would ever file claims even if the class won by noting
that "[n]o claimant in the 6 years of the progress of the action had shown any interest
in Eisen's claim." Eisen VI 1010.
149. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 296 n.7 (2d Cir. 1968), quoting Kalven
& Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. Rav. 684

(1941).

150. The Second Circuit has recently recognized the potential difficulty in process-

ing large numbers of individual claims. Eisen VI 1017.
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a notice, and when attorneys are given an incentive to foment litiga-

tion and, considering the realities of the situation, to solicit clients
with the assistance of the court, the danger exists that the rule will be

used to achieve results diametrically opposed to those intended by
its draftsmen. 15 '
As Chief Judge Lumbard noted in his earlier dissent in Eisen, "[r]ule
23 does not require or contemplate that courts will hear causes of action as class actions merely because they will not get to hear the case
' 52
any other way.'
There is a basic and unsolvable conflict between the primary purpose of rule 23-efficiency-and the desire of class action "liberalizers"
to aid small claimants. According to the Advisory Committee Notes,
[s]ubdivision (b) (3) encompasses those cases in which a class action
would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote
uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated. .

. [I]t is

only where this predominance exists that economies can be achieved
by the class action device.15 3

It cannot be argued that liberalized class action procedures increase
court efficiency by consolidating claims when plaintiffs have not even
considered suing until notice of the class action was received. 5 4 Moreover, if each potential claim is only a few dollars, administrative costs
and attorneys fees may reduce a class member's share to mere pennies.155 Furthermore, even that amount is subject to diminution if the
defendant does not have sufficient resources to satisfy a large judgment. 5 Named plaintiffs who might have had valid and recoverable
individual claims may recover nothing when the class action helps to
bankrupt a defendant. Finally, whatever small individual recovery is
had may be lost when a losing defendant subsequently raises prices to
absorb the judgment.
151. Handler, supra note 14, at 10.
152. Eisen II 572.
153. Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 32, at 103.
154. Plaintiffs have often argued that without the benefit of the class action they
would not be able to afford bringing individual actions, or joined ones, even if attorneys' fees were later granted to them. Occasionally a court replies in a manner
similar to that of Chief Judge Lumbard in Eisen. See quote cited in text accompanying
note 152 supra. "It is not the purpose of the class action to save every suit from dismissal because it is too insignificant to receive its own day in federal court." Bailey v.
Sabine River Auth., 54 F.R.D. 42 (W.D. La. 1971).
155. See Handler, supra note 14, at 9-10; ACTL REPORT, supra note 18, at 21-25.
156. See Franks, supra note 136, at 3.
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B. The In Terrorem Effect
Another reason given for increasing the availability of the class
action is the in terrorem effect the action has on potential defendants.
It is argued that once businesses realize they can be sued for seemingly insignificant misrepresentations, they will be more likely to deal
fairly with consumers.
Class actions have a prophylactic effect, similar to stockholders' derivative actions in the corporate field, providing a potent deterrent against
large-scale antisocial behavior. . . . The preventive aspect of class
actions in areas of social concern often makes them a potent ally to
administrative agencies in the pursuit of goals that are often prospective, rather than restorative and retrospective. The receptacle for
many class actions capable of performing these functions is subdivision (b) (3).157
The therapeutic value of the securities fraud class action was discussed in Dolgow v. Anderson in the following manner:
Those who criticize the class action on the grounds that it stirs up
plaintiffs and serves only to provide fees for attorneys overlook the
fact that we are not dealing with the traditional lawsuit which concerns primarily those litigants before the court. The public's concern
with openness and honesty in public securities markets gives it an interest no less significant than that of particular plaintiffs and defendants.158
Nowhere, however, in the Advisory Committee Notes is there any in-

timation that the class action should serve the purpose of policing
business misconduct or punishing wrongdoers. If there were no undesirable consequences resulting from such "private attorney general"
suits, one would be less inclined to argue against the in terrorem
theory. However, the massive and indiscriminate use of the class action threatens the courts as well as those claimants who need the action to handle claims of substantial pecuniary value.15 9 Furthermore,
157. Homburger, supra note 25, at 642. See also Goldhammer, supra note 146, at
235.
158. 43 F.R.D. 472, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
159.
The potential recovery in this case--calculated to be at least $18,000,000 for
each alleged violation of the act-would certainly be a powerful deterrent
to violation of the Truth in Lending Act. On the other hand, it must be
questioned whether the deterrent effect of the rule should be granted such
high priority. "The cost in judicial time and consequent impairment of rights
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the desired deterrent effect is doubtful in many instances because of
uncertainty in the applicable substantive law.16 0
The class action is not the only means for providing consumer
protection from unscrupulous businessmen. Legislatures can pass
statutes which permit attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in consumer cases.161 Legislatures can make more business practices unlawful and can provide more funds for attorney general'0 and agency
action. Commentators, however, have voiced their dismay at the ineffectiveness of administrative agencies in dealing with consumer
problems.
It is the class suit as an adversary technique that we see as the tool
par excellence for socio-legal reform, compared to administrative
agencies. Human nature being what it is, there is no substitute for
3
self-interest as the motivating power for socio-legal reform. 0
It must be remembered that the foundation of a class action is that
it is "a semi-public remedy administered by the lawyer in private practice." Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
of other litigants appears too high a price to pay for deterrence which can be
effected through alternative means."
Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134, 138 (D. Kan. 1972), quoting ACTL REPORT, supra note 18, at 22.
160.
If the antitrust laws were precise and crystallized something might be
said in favor of such an enormous expansion of potential treble damage liability, speculative as the damages might be. But the fact remains that because
there are few "bright lines" in the area, even experts who have devoted their
entire professional lives to the practice of antitrust law often find it impossible
to advise a client with any degree of certainty whether his contemplated
conduct will transgress lawful bounds.
Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artist Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295
(2d Cir. 1971). For an annotation on this case, see 1972 Trade Cas. 91,327 (1972).
161. The district court in Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 138 (D. Kan.
1972), pointed out that a class action was unnecessary in a Truth in Lending Act
suit because attorneys' fees are provided to a prevailing plaintiff under the Act. A
recent amendment to the New Jersey consumer laws requires courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees in consumer actions. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-19 (West Supp. 1974).
However, the statute would award such fees in favor of prevailing defendants as well as
prevailing plaintiffs. See also Eisen VI 1019.
162. In one recent case, the California Attorney General took the lead in consolidating and settling five private class actions and the state's fraud action against
Boise Cascade for $24 million in damages to alleged defrauded land buyers. According to Attorney General Younger: "We have negotiations with other developers on the
front burner .... We'd like to think this will set a pattern for the others ... and show
we are serious." L.A. Times, Dec. 19, 1972, at 1, col. 7. This writer has expressed general displeasure with the use of coercive settlements in class actions. However, where
the state is involved in negotiating a criminal fraud settlement the benefits are more
likely to reach the class members rather than the attorneys.
163. Louisell, Miller & West, supra note 12, at 1064.
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Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 717 (1941). It is often the only
practical effectuation of remedial provisions of legislative policies.
The action of Federal agencies entrusted with the enforcement of
public policy is limited to compelling compliance with a statute.
Private litigation, particularly in the form of a class action, serves to
supplement administrative action in furthering the public policy. 6 4
It has also been pointed out that agency action does not provide the
same deterrence as private action, since agencies cannot seek damages
from offenders. 165 In California, however, civil penalties are available
in governmental consumer fraud actions. 1 66 Also, where individual
164. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539, 543 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
165. Id. See also Eisen IV 270; Cherner v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 201 F. Supp.
934, 937 (D. Mass. 1962).
166. Under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 1964), it is illegal to advertise any product or service, or to make any statement designed to induce a business
transaction in an untrue or misleading manner. Succeeding sections of the code enumeraate the types of untrue and misleading statements which are prohibited. Id. §§ 17501
et seq. A corollary statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West Supp. 1973), declares these
statements to constitute unfair competition. Actions for injunctive relief may be brought
by the Attorney General, district attorneys, other local officials "or by any person acting
for the interests of itself, its members or the general public." CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 17535 (West 1964). The Attorney General and local officials are empowered to seek
civil penalties of $2,500 for each violation. Id. § 1736 (West Supp. 1973). It is conceivable that discovery will lead the plaintiff to multiple, alleged violations, aggregating the potential penalties so that they will be "large enough to be effective against even
the largest corporations and chains." Lorenz, Consumer Fraud and the San Diego District Attorney's Office, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 47, 50 (1970).
Under the current statutory scheme, funds recovered from such suits or settlements
are not disbursed to complaining citizens. However, in a few settlements, the Attorney
General has required that trusts be created to benefit private citizens. See, e.g., People
v. Ball Enterprises, Inc., Civil No. 185521 (Super. Ct., Sacramento, Cal., Aug. 28,
1968); People v. Portrait Arts of America, Civil No. 938005 (L.A., Cal., Super. Ct.,
Aug. 23, 1968). The California statutory scheme can be amended to resemble a qui tam
action, which would allow penalties collected under section 17536 to be disbursed to
individuals who can prove their claims. See generally Lorenz, supra;Project-The Direct
Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A.L. Rzv. 883, 955-67 (1969). The
statutory methods avoid the solicitation problem, the notice difficulty and the issue of
huge attorneys' fees. If used on a broad scale with trusts created for injured consumers,
these statutes might be viable partners of the consumer class action. Cf. California v.
General Motors Corp., 431 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1970) (improper to remove an action
arising under the California code to federal court merely because the defendant's alleged
misstatement of prices violated a federal requirement that manufacturers list, among
other items, the suggested retail price).
One writer has suggested that the parens patriae suit brought by the state on behalf of its citizens (damages to be recovered for the state's use) may be a plausible alternative to the consumer class action. Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the
Job? (Plaintiff's Viewpoint), 55 F.R.D. 365 (1972). In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405
U.S. 251 (1972), the Supreme Court dealt with the parens patriae concept, under
which the state alleges a general injury to its economy. The Court rejected this theory
on the ground that the state would normally have no standing in antitrust cases unless
its own commercial interests had been injured directly. Id. at 264. It was suggested,
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claims are small and the unmanageable consequences of a class action
are large, an injunctive order may offer enough remedial value.'" 7 In
the securities area, Chief Judge Lumbard wrote:
Even if plaintiff is unable to maintain an action, when controversy
touches the interest of so many members of the public it is sufficient
that Congress has provided a public agency whose duty it is to supervise and regulate such matters. Comment, Recovery of Damages in
Class Actions, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 768, 785 (1965). The matter of
proper commissions to be paid by those who engage in odd-lots transactions is within the jurisdiction of the SEC. It has been the subject
of study and in due time the commission will take appropriate ac108
tion.
One court has suggested that
the burgeoning in recent years of interest in publicly supported legal
service organizations and of private support for legal aid and public
interest law firms cannot be disregarded. Many small but important
claims heretofore, for purposes of litigation, beyond the pale of financial practicability, have been successfully litigated by such organizations in recent years. Thus an adverse class action decision may ring
out as a death knell on far fewer occcasions than superficial analysis
would suggest.169
In a 1967 opinion, wherein Judge Will was faced with the question of whether individual damages of class members could be aggregated for the purpose of attaining the minimum federal jurisdictional
amount he observed that
however, that a private class action for the alleged antitrust violations (price fixing)
would be permitted. Id. at 266. Had the parens patriae argument been accepted, a
state would have been able to sue for damages based on a loss of commerce to its citizens.
While the method of setting damages would be guesswork, as it is in so many antitrust
cases, the parens patriae suit would avoid the difficulties of notifying class members.
The res judicata effect of this type of suit on potential private plaintiffs was not discussed in the Standard Oil case, because it was unnecessary to the decision.
167. In government consumer actions brought under the California statute, CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500 et seq. (West 1964), no bond is required for temporary
or permanent injunctions.
168. Eisen II 572 (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting). It has also been said that
[t]hose typical consumer class actions in which the Eisen rule would be likely to
operate involve areas of federal law in which public enforcement co-exists with
private remedies. There is no compelling need to go beyond those inducements
to the bar which already encourage a lively pursuit of private enforcement
remedies.
Hackett v. General Host Corp., 15 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 871, 877 (3d Cir. 1972).
169. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 15 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 871, 875 (3d Cir.
1972).
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[w]ithout the searching and determined scrutiny of gadfly taxpayers,
often solitary in their pursuit of justice, many excesses of governmental administration might escape unnoticed. In order for the taxpayer suit to remain effective as a watchdog instrument for the public
welfare, the ability of a single individual to maintain such an action
170
must be recognized.
However in 1969, the United States Supreme Court rejected the aggregation of claims for federal jurisdictional purposes in Snyder v. Harris.171 In so doing, the Court balanced the advantages of more consumer and taxpayer class actions with the intent of the diversity jurisdiction statute' 72 and concluded that class action policy could not alter
the meaning of the statute.
It is not suggested that if class actions are made more difficult to
bring, agencies and attorneys general will fill the gap. It is contended,
however, that the class action itself is not capable of handling every
conceivable consumer or shareholder claim and new procedures must
be devised in order to make the class action an effective tool in truly
7
necessary cases.' 3
III.

SOME ABusEs ARISING FROM LIBERALIZATION OF THE CLASS

ACTION

A. Solicitation by Attorneys
The potential for widespread solicitation in the wake of La Sala
was noted above. 7 4 Even some champions of the expanded availability
170. Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465, 471 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
171. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). See also Zahn v. International Paper Co., 94 S. Ct.
505 (1973) (in which the Court refused to permit the named plaintiffs, each of whom
alleged damages greater than $10,000, from representing class members whose damages
were less than the jurisdictional minimum).
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
173. One truly unnecessary case for use of the class action was Stilson v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 28 Cal. App. 3d 270, 104 Cal. Rptr. 581 (Ist Dist. 1972), wherein
plaintiff brought an action on behalf of himself and all others whose names were allegedly used without permission in a Reader's Digest promotional scheme. Plaintiff
sought an injunction and nominal damages on behalf of each class member. The court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, saying
[although an award of but nominal damages to each of the millions of unnamed plaintiffs would impose a heavy penalty upon defendants, it would
hardly serve the interest of any plaintiff. Yet to award nominal damages,
the court would be required to examine the mental and subjective state of
each of the millions of plaintiffs, since in each case such individual appraisal
is of the essence of the claim for damages and, indeed, of the cause of action.
Id. at 274, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
174. See note 120 supra & accompanying text.
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of class actions have observed that class actions could become a tool for

client solicitation to the detriment of individual litigants, the courts,
and the profession itself. According to one plaintiff's lawyer:
Having an evangelical view about enforcement of the antitrust laws,
it appeared to me from the outset that Rule 23 would be prostituted
for the obvious reason that it had the capacity to produce astronomical fees. Such a legal mechanism encourages strike suits and produces
resentment. And that resentment has predictably produced, in turn,
the current tidal wave of protest against the rule. And in this whole
process my fear is that the antitrust laws, out of which the whole
problem originated, will be the innocent bystander victim ....

Class

actions should be permitted only in limited circumstances and only
where there is no better way to insure that a far-reaching antitrust
(or securities) violation
does not leave its willful perpetrators un175
justly enriched.
In arguing that legal aid attorneys are free from the solicitation taint
because they do not profit from successful class actions, one consumer
class action proponent has written that
the economic inducements to a class action may lead [private] attorneys to flirt with violations of the Canons of Professional Ethics'17
or those criminal statutes, i.e. those concerning champerty, which
prohibit the solicitation of legal business. Indeed, the possibility that
an attorney might be tempted to use the class action as an instrument for the improper procurement of clients or to intimidate defendants into a settlement (the so-called strike suit) has resulted
in
177
some courts viewing the class action with considerable disfavor.
Not only can an attorney use the class action as a device for soliciting clients, but there is the danger he may do so under the apparent
175. Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the job? (Plaintiff's Viewpoint),
55 F.R.D. 365, 366-67 (1972).
176. For an outline of the various applicable canons and statutes, see notes
131-36 supra.
177. Starrs, supra note 35, at 409. Even the "liberal" class action courts have
perceived the problem. In its earlier Eisen opinion, the Second Circuit said, "Bearing
in mind the desirability of providing small claimants with a forum in which to seek
redress for alleged large scale anti-trust violations, we are still reluctant to permit actions
to proceed where they are not likely to benefit anyone but the lawyers who bring them."
Eisen II 567 (footnote omitted). In another case, a district court which granted class
action status to several hundred governmental entities denied such status to a subclass of
private builders. The court believed the builders' subclass was too large (18,000) and
amorphous to expect that the named plaintiff could adequately represent potential
competitors in the suit. In addition, the court concluded that notice to the builders
would take on "ambulance-chasing connotations." Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda
Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 464 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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aegis of the court. In Korn v. Franchard,17s plaintiff's counsel allegedly
sent misleading notice to the class without the court's approval and
also used a discovered list of defendant's investors to solicit information on a case unrelated to the Korn class action. In Kronenberg v.
Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc.,"79 plaintiff's lawyer allegedly misrepre-

sented certain facts to the judge and included an unauthorized and
misleading letter with the court approved notice.
The class action solicitation problem was discussed in depth in
Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc. 80 In that case, an association of franchisees hired a lawyer to assert certain rebate rights against
their franchisor. Unable to negotiate successfully with the franchisor,
the association asked the lawyer to file an antitrust suit. The lawyer
drafted a letter for the association president soliciting more franchisees to join both the association and the lawsuit. The trial court
dismissed the class action holding that the lawyer's drafting of the
solicitation letter constituted either a violation of local federal court
rule 39, a breach of the canons of ethics (although no canon was specifically cited), or inadequate representation under Federal Rule
23 (a) (4). The circuit court reversed the dismissal, holding that the
only impropriety involved was the attorney's failure to cite the possible
disadvantages of the suit in his letter. Since the attorney had been previously retained by the association it was held proper to inform association members of their opportunity to join a mutually rewarding lawsuit. The court also held that the attorney had the right to solicit nonassociation members for the suit since "[a] lawyer whose client will
178. 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972). The circuit court reversed the trial court's
dismissal of the class action, holding in part that in whatever misconduct plaintiff's attorney had engaged, the class action should not be prejudiced since "qualified, experienced and generally able" counsel had replaced the original attorney. Id. at 1212.
179. 281 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Remarking that the court's primary
concern should be for the interests of the members of the class, the court permitted the
class action to continue in spite of the ethical and legal violations of the attorney. Perhaps the court realized that if it dismissed the action, it might have to notify the class
under rule 23(e). See also Taub v. Glickman, 14 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 847 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), where the court dismissed a class action because the plaintiff's attorney not
only sent out a solicitation letter with the court approved notice, but also failed to appear two consecutive times to answer calendar calls. In Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47
F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1969), the court permitted "reverse solicitation," dismissing a class
action after one potential class member (and apparently his attorney) personally secured opt-out affidavits from the vast majority of class members who had not yet received notice of the pendency of the action. One may speculate on whether such a
large majority of class members would have opted out had not an opponent of the
class personally contacted other potential class members.
180. 458 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1972).
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benefit from joinder of others similarly situated may seek out claimants if his motive is not to secure fees for himself."' 81 Standing alone
this holding would seem to make sense. If the only purpose of a solicitation is to secure a group of plaintiffs large enough to bring an
action, and if the lawyer will not receive a larger fee with the expansion of the class, the fear that the class action will be used only
to benefit the attorney is unjustified. 182 However, it is not clear whether
the attorney in Halverson was on a retainer to the association (and
hence would not receive a fee based on the overall recovery of the
class).
Faced with the solicitation problem, some courts have prohibited
counsel from communicating with potential class members until the
time for opting out to the court's notice has passed. 83 In order to
avoid the appearance of court participation in the solicitation of class
members, the Federal Judicial Center'84 in its Manual for Complex
and MultidistrictLitigation (1970) has made the following recommendations:
In order to guard against unapproved action of this sort, it is recommended that each court adopt a local rule forbidding unapproved
direct or indirect written and oral communications by formal parties
or their counsel with potential and actual class members, who are
not formal parties, provided that such proposed written communications submitted to and approved by order of court may be distributed
to the party or parties designated or described in the Court order
85
of approval.

Regardless of the measures taken to eliminate solicitation or to
mitigate its impact, the fact remains that "the notification of the class
members has as its very basis for existence the bringing into court of
a multitude of additional claimants and litigants . . . [although] no
181. Id. at 931 (citations omitted).
182. The analysis is similar to the one regarding class actions brought by legal
services attorneys. See Starrs, supra note 35, at 409. See also In re Lashbrook, 146 Kan.
752, 73 P.2d 1106 (1937) (only technical violation where lawyer helped plaintiff organize a society to sue insurer, since otherwise plaintiff would not have had the funds
to sue alone).
183. See, e.g., Illinois v. Harper & Row Publ., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 494 (N.D.
Ill.
1969); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 463
(E.D. Pa. 1968); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
184. The Federal Judicial Center was established by Congress in 1968 to study
the problems of the federal court system.
185. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LTIGATION 16 (1970).
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substantial sentiment to make claims [may] exist among members of
the alleged class."'81 6
There are several reasons for fearing solicitation in addition to
the court congestion and inflated fees problems. 8 7 First, an attorney
interested in representing, settling, and getting paid by a large class
may not be sufficiently concerned with his individual client's welfare. 8
The pressure on both sides to settle an otherwise unwieldy class action
may produce marvelous fees for plaintiff's attorney, some "windfall"
compensation to each member of the class, but far less compensation
to the named plaintiff than he would have received had he litigated
or settled separately. As Justice Harlan wrote in dissent in NAACP v.
Button:
Running perhaps even deeper [than the fear of a lawyer's unjustified

pecuniary gain] is the desire of the profession, of courts, and of legislatures to prevent any interference with the uniquely personal relationship between lawyer and client and to maintain untrammelled
by outside influences the responsibility which the lawyer owes to the
courts he serves.' 8 9

A second problem is the converse of the first: Many lawyers bring
class actions in an attempt to frighten defendants into settlement disregarding their own fiduciary duties to protect the interests of the
entire class under rule 23(e) and state common law counterparts. 9 0
The adequacy of representation requirement of all class actions is violated in such instances. Uninterested lawyers may tie up the courts
for years with class actions which will be dismissed or forgotten in the
end. Even if the court finally orders notice of dismissal under La Sala
186. Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View, 10 B.C. IND. &
Comm. L.R. 515, 521-22 (1968). See Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243
(N.D. Ga. 1971).
187. "[Rlegulations which reflect hostility to stirring up litigation have been aimed
chiefly at those who urge recourse to the courts for private gain, serving no public interest." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 440 (1962).
188. For a general discussion of solicitation, see id. at 440 n.19. The possibility
of compromising a client's interest in order to represent the class is discussed in connection with La Sale. See text accompanying notes 120-145 supra.
189. 371 U.S. 415, 460 (1962) (dissenting opinion). While accepting Justice
Harlan's viewpoint as it applies generally to solicitation, this author agrees with the
majority decision in Button that state statutes prohibiting solicitation must not be applied to inhibit the constitutional rights of individual or group litigants.
190. An exception to the fiduciary rule is found in CAL. Civ. CoDm § 1782 (West
1973), which encourages a potential plaintiff to threaten a class suit in writing but
to withdraw prior to commencement of the action if his own claim has been satisfied.
Maintenance of the class action is optional unless the complaint has been filed.
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or Anaconda,'91 the years of delay may have destroyed the interest of

any potential named plaintiffs or may have made it unlikely that potential class members have saved appropriate bills or receipts. All of
these problems lead to the conclusion that
[t]he principal-perhaps only-beneficiaries have been lawyers. In
combining great incentive for unprofessional conduct by lawyers
with little potential benefit to their clients, the amended Rule, as interpreted by some District Courts [as well as circuit and state courts],
poses serious threats to public confidence in the judiciary and the integrity of the bar. 92
93
B. Attorneys' Contingent Fees'

It has often been asserted that large attorneys' fees are necessary
in order to induce private lawyers to take on the demands of major
class actions. "Quite obviously, a major incentive to forceful prosecution is the substantial counsel fee plaintiffs' attorney believes he may
be awarded if he is successful."' 94 Assuming arguendo that the public
and the courts need and want more large class actions, one must wonder whether astronomical attorneys' fees are necessary to achieve this.
The American College of Trial Lawyers has estimated that while the
average recovery of each of the six million potential claimants in the
Eisen case would be $3.90, plaintiffs' attorneys are likely to receive
191. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa.
1967).
192. Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction?, 55 F.R.D.
375, 377 (1972).
From a viewpoint different than that advanced in this paper, Justice Brennan
five years ago wrote the following:
Not only has little been accomplished within the profession to prepare
to meet the challenges of today's problems, but the obsolescence of our code
of ethics and institutions has been dramatically compounded. An institutional
framework designed for the service of the law's traditional clients, with their
ready access to legal services, cannot now satisfy the profession's responsibility
to the client born of more recent social upheavals, a task that implicates quite
different and practical considerations. The profession must, indeed, purge itself
of the inbred precepts of another day, rethink its code of practice and reshape its internal mechanisms for meeting its public responsibilities. Else the
dangerous cleavage between a public sector of the bar devoted to the developing issues of society and a private sector-the practicing Bar-which ignores
them will only widen.
Brennan, The Responsibilities of the Legal Profession, 54 A.B.A.J. 121, 122 (1968).
193. See generally Comment, Attorney's Fees in Individual and Class Action Antitrust Litigation, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1656 (1972).
194. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Goldhammer, supra note 146, at 235.
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$5,400,000 if they are successful. 195 The College also notes the case of
Newman v. Stein, 9 6 in which a $5,000,000 settlement was approved by
the court. Here, attorneys for the plaintiff class "have indicated that
they will apply for an allowance in the amount of $1,250,000."' 97
The courts have occasionally expressed concern over the large
counsel fees awarded in class actions. In an old rule 23 case, one circuit court disallowed counsel fees totaling $500,000. In modifying the
lower court's judgment for plaintiffs, the circuit court held that 15
percent of the amount recovered, whatever that was found to be, would
be a reasonable fee for the attorneys.198 It is not clear, however, whether
the percentage method lowered counsel fees in that case. In another
action, the Third Circuit displayed "some concern" in allowing counsel
fees totaling 25 percent in a class action which was settled before
trial.19 9 However, the court deferred to the discretion of the trial judge
on that issue and permitted the 25 percent fee.
The Mznual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation makes the
following recommendations regarding attorneys' fees:
If the action is concluded by settlement, the Court should require
a statement of all proposed charges for fees and expenses by the
counsel for the class and any subclasses, including the identity of all
counsel sharing in the fees. Only reasonable charges for fees and expenses should be authorized upon approval by the Court after notice
and hearing. All other such charges should be expressly forbidden
by Court order.
If the litigation is concluded by determination on the merits, the
Court should expressly provide in judgment, or in one of the earlier
class action management orders, for control by the Court of the
charges for attorneys' fees and expenses. The cost of the legal representation and of expenses seems to be a proper consideration in determining the identity of the -representative parties for the class
in an affirmative class action determination under Rule 23.200
195. ACTL REPORT, supra note 18, at 24. The ACTL figures assume that all six

million potential class members will submit claims.
196. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 3,316 (1971).
197. ACTL REPORT 24.
198. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 587 (10th Cir.
1962).

199. Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 15 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 625,
628 (3d Cir. 1971). The settlement totaled $2,000,000 and the $500,000 was split
among several plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys who participated in lengthy settlement negotiations.
200. FEDERAL
GATION

20 (1970).

JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTmISTRICT LiTi-
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The manual makes no recommendation regarding what are "reasonable" attorneys' fees and thus is of little use in aiding the courts or
2 01
proposing policy in this area.
It seems that there is one ramification of the class action attorneys'
fees issue which has seldom been discussed by the courts or the commentators. Let us assume that a class action has been settled for a
certain sum based on a percentage of what the parties and the court
agree would be the approximate aggregate claims of all the members
of the class. It is from that settlement figure the attorney's contingency
fee is calculated regardless of whether any members of the class return
their proofs of claim. If no class member responds to the settlement,
the attorney still receives his fee based on the total settlement figure.
Since the bulk of the settlement will not be disbursed, defendants
suffer only to the extent of the attorney's fees paid. Plaintiff's attorney
is well compensated, but class members do not recover because they
are not interested or because they cannot prove their claims.
There is no sound reason for awarding attorneys hundreds of
thousands or even millions of dollars when the class member "clients"
receive virtually nothing. At the conclusion of a lawsuit or settlement,
victorious class members may conclude that there is more justice in
letting the defendant keep its alleged unlawful gains than in generating large attorneys' fees. In spite of the advent of public interest and
neighborhood law firms, as well as the growth of class actions, the
legal profession is still looked upon with distrust by certain segments
of society2 02 Hobbes' statement in Leviathan that "[u]nnecessary laws
201. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 12 states in part: "In fixing
fees it should never be forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of
justice and not a mere money-getting trade."
202. Justice Powell made the following remarks at an American Bar Association
Convention in 1965:
I have found, far and wide, a growing dissatisfaction with the adequacy
of the discipline maintained by our profession . .

.

. This dissatisfaction is

justified. It is found among thoughtful lawyers . . .and it is widely prevalent
among laymen.
Powell, The President's Annual Address: The State of the Legal Profession, 51 A.B.A.J.
821, 825 (1965). See also Kaufman, supra note 12.
Journalist Martin Mayer told the American Bar Association in 1972 "[y]our work
as lawyers is perceived by the public as inefficient, old-fashioned and overpriced."
Mayer, Professional Performance: An Outside View, 44 N.Y.S.B.J. 441, 443 (1972).
Mr. Mayer implied the need for changes in the American legal system, including the
use of more administrative tribunals to handle disputes. However, Mr. Mayer
offered the following comment:
The ardent young lawyers who hope to change the world seem to me less admirable than their placid and more selfish elders when they speak of their work
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are not good laws; but traps for money" 20 3 may have a special meaning to a class member who has waited curiously for years to find out
whether he will recover any money from "that class action" and then
learns that he will receive a few dollars while his lawyer receives a
few hundred thousand-or a few million.
If class actions are beneficial to society, then the astronomical contingent fee must be abolished so that class members can take a greater
share of the recovery. Where class members have not responded to a
settlement or a judgment notice, the attorney should not receive a fee
based on the entire judgment. Lowering the fees will not only provide
more recovery to the class members who do respond, but will also
promote public esteem for the profession. Twenty to twenty-five percent contingency fees may be appropriate in personal injury actions
where the individual plaintiff has been grievously injured and his
lawyer needs strong inducement to pursue recovery to the utmost.
But where the class member would receive $8.90 if he is able to prove
his claim, does it really make sense to award the attorney $5,400,000?
One commentator has noted that in a class action settlement, "virtually no additional work is involved beyond that contemplated for
the retained clients." 20 4 While that may be an understatement, it is
certainly true that an increase in the size of the class is not met by a
20 5
concomitant increase in the amount of work done by the lawyer.
In comparing the contingency fee in class actions with the contingency
fee elsewhere, another commentator has written,
[i]n non-representative suits it has long been held that contingent
fee contracts contemplate arm's length bargaining. Where an attorney
volunteers his services in an easy case, the contingent contract is
deemed to have been procured by fraud. Counsel may not solicit a
contingent fee contract. But even the common ambulance chaser has
in terms of principles they hope to establish rather than clients they hope
to serve.
Id. at 447. For a critical layman's viewpoint, see M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH
LAWYERS (1969). For a more laudatory "insider's" opinion, see Schwartz, The Legal
Profession in the United States: 1960-1980, 5 J. BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N, Sept., 1971,
at 60.
203. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 227-28 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1935).
204. Simon, supra note 192, at 391.
205. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 12 makes the following admonition:
In fixing fees, lawyers should avoid charges which overestimate their advice
and services, as well as those which undervalue them. A client's ability to pay
cannot justify a charge in excess of the value of the service though his
poverty may require a less charge, or even none at all.
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at least the written consent of all his clients which is more than cani
be said of the securities fraud attorney [who proceeds on behalf of
class members because they have not notified him otherwise]. 200
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently adopted a rule which
limits contingent fees in tort cases.
In any matter where a client's claim for damages is based upon
the alleged tortious conduct of another, including products liability
claims, and the client is not a subrogee, an attorney shall not contract
for, charge, or collect a contingent fee in excess of the following
limits:
(1) 50% on the first $1000 recovered;
(2) 40% on the next $2000 recovered;
(3) 33Y% on the next $47,000 recovered;
(4) 20% on the next $50,000 recovered;
(5) 10% on any amount recovered over $100,000 .... 207
This author would support the adoption of such a rule in all class
actions. Another possibility is for the court to award a lawyer his
normal hourly rate times the hours spent on the case plus five percent
of the recovery. In any event, ceilings should be set on class action fees.
For an interested lawyer, a $300,000 or $400,000 possible contingency
fee cannot be a great deal less appealing than a $1,000,000 potential fee
-especially if he is imbued with the messianic spirit. Another possibility is to avoid the class action by modifying and extending to consumer actions the now limited policy of awarding attorney's fees, to the
prevailing party, subject to the court's discretion. 20 While such a
policy might increase the number of consumer actions brought, it
would eliminate many gargantuan class actions and would reward the
individual plaintiff who is truly interested in bringing a lawsuit. To
avoid burdening consumer plaintiffs with possible costs if they should
lose, the law could prevent the awarding of attorney's fees to successful
defendants in such consumer actions.
206. Franks, supranote 136, at 8.
207. For contrasting discussions of the contingency fee in general, see Arnould &
Corley, Fee Schedules Should Be Abolished, 57 A.B.A.J. 655 (1971); Miller & Weil,
Let's Improve, Not Kill, Fee Schedules, 58 A.B.A.J. 31 (1972).
208. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2) (1970); Cf. CAL.

Crv. CoDE § 1717 (West 1973). The New Jersey statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-19
(West Supp. 1974), orders the trial judge to award reasonable attorneys' fees in consumer actions, but it appears the fees can be awarded to a prevailing defendant as well
as a prevailing plaintiff.
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C. Notice Abuses
Rule 23(c)(2) requires that in (b)(3) actions, the court must "direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable," advising
class members that they will be excluded from the class if they so
request by a specified date. The rule is silent on whether notice must
be sent in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions. The few courts faced with that
problem have concluded that notice to the class is a due process requirement but have also concluded that opt-in notice may be used in
(b)(1) and (b)(2) actions.20 9
The Advisory Committee Notes do not explain why the opt-out
notice form was chosen for (b)(3) actions. Most likely the committee
realized that where relatively small claims were involved, class members would have a tendency to disregard the court notice or to neglect
to opt-in. As one court put it: "We would be naive not to recognize
that where ... the maximum amount recoverable on behalf of each

of thousands of stockholders would be quite small, those receiving
notice would in all probability not have enough incentive to take any
action." 210 The realization that many class members will be uninterested in the litigation should have led the Committee to recommend opt-in notice rather than opt-out.
Failure to opt out cannot be interpreted as interest in the class action. This is shown by the fact that in settled cases, where members
of the class get an automatic recovery by responding, most of those
who do not opt out do not bother to file claims. The result therefore,
is not the consolidation of many viable claims in a single simplified
lawsuit, but rather the generation
of claims for people who have no
211
interest in pursuing them.

In City & County of Denver v. American Oil Co.,212 only two out of
126 potential class members opted-in when the trial court specifically
requested the opt-in notice. In Korn v. Franchard,only 233 out of
1,000 potential class members responded to a type of opt-in notice;
77 of those replying requested exclusion. 21 3 In another action, only
209. Eisen II 565; Advisory Committee Notes 107. See also Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 54 F.R.D. 465 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53
F.R.D. 539 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
210. Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
211. Simon, supra note 192, at 377-78.
212. 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971).
213. 50 F.R.D. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972). In
reversing the trial court's denial of class status, the circuit court pointed out that the
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15 percent of a class of 90,000 filed a claim in response to a notice of
settlement. 214 The message is clear: the opt-out notice needlessly burdens overcrowded courts by bringing "a multitude of disinterested
claimants" 21 5 into litigation. The opt-out notice has been condemned
as an "unprecedented" extension of the federal courts' jurisdiction over
the person by binding nonappearing, nonresident parties without their
formal consent.21 6 Rule 23 and its state common law counterparts
should be changed to require opt-in instead of opt-out notice or to at
least give the trial judge discretion as to which form of notice to order.
Occasionally a feeble effort has been made to force class members
to submit proofs of claim in response to notice of the action. 217 By requiring proofs of claim these courts have attempted to circumvent the
opt-out provision of rule 23(c)(2). They have also attempted to gauge
the potential liability of the defendant in order to avoid one of the
most unfair consequences of rule 23(c)(2)-the defendant cannot suggest a settlement with any degree of accuracy nor can he make a
knowledgeable decision whether to settle or proceed with the litigation since he has no idea how many potential claims exist. Nevertheless, the appellate courts have overruled the lower courts' demands
"opt-in proof of claim" was optional and thus could not be relied on as an accurate
picture of the class' interest in the suit. It is not clear why the circuit court viewed the

proof of claim form as optional; the notice appears to have been phrased in mandatory
language. One would assume, therefore, that the court decided it was optional because
rule 23(c) (2) calls for opt-out notice; any other notice is outside the scope of the
statute. 456 F.2d at 1210.
214. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., Civil No. 68-4026 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 13,

1971) (unreported decision), aff'd sub nom. Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Grinnell Corp.,
59 F.R.D. 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
215. ACTL REPORT 11.
216. School Dist. v. Harper & Row PubI., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001, 1005 (E.D. Pa.
1967). The order denying class status was vacated in a later consolidated action. Illinois

v. Harper & Row Publ., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1969). In presenting its
"jurisdictional extension argument," the earlier opinion was most likely wrong when it

said:
By its silence, a proposed class member not only forfeits in previously unfettered right to choose its own forum and to initiate its own litigation, but
apparently waives any objections it might have concerning the lack of personal
jurisdiction and venue of the Court.
267 F. Supp. at 1005. Other courts have held that a class member may later contest a
judgment, for or against him, on the basis that he did not receive notice of the action.
See, e.g., Sertic v. International Bhd. of Carpenters, 459 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1972).
217. See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452
(E.D. Pa. 1968); School Dist. v. Harper & Row Publ., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D.
Pa. 1967); cf. Korn v. Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D. 57, 59-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also
Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions Under Federal Rule
23(b)(3), 54 F.R.D. 501 (1972); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1788 (1972).
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for proofs of claim in all but one case.218 Still, in overruling these
demands, the courts have recognized that class members will eventually need to submit such proof if their action is successful. "Until
liability is established, however, it would be wasteful for thousands of
plaintiffs to search their files for similar data."2 19 Such shortsightedness
belies the court's interest in providing the most manageable action
under rule 23(b)(3)(D), and in deciding whether individual issues
predominate over class issues. It would seem much more wasteful to
continue a class action for years, incurring huge notice costs and accumulating many hours of court and attorney time, only to find that
very few class members can prove damages. In some instances, it is
probable that class members will misplace their proofs of claim in
the interim between notice and settlement or judgment. Except in
cases where it is clear the defendant's records will disclose each class
member's damages, rule 23 and its state law counterparts should be
changed to permit proof of claim with the opt-in notice.
D. Altering of Substantive Law
The Vasque 220 and Dolgow221 decisions have altered the substantive
law of misrepresentation and fraud. Under those cases, plaintiffs in
class actions no longer need prove individual reliance upon alleged
misrepresentations.2 2 As a result of Vasquez, it has become defendant's
burden to prove that he is not guilty of misrepresentation. Courts
have obfuscated these changes in the substantive law by stating that
"procedural difficulties" must not create obstacles when "the class action device is the most practicable method . . . of vindicating . . .
claims."22s Whether or not a plaintiff must prove reliance upon alleged
218. See, e.g., Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1209, 1211 (2d Cir.
1972); Eisen IV; Illinois v. Harper & Row Publ., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 491 (N.D.
Ill. 1969); cf. Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
219. Illinois v. Harper & Row Publ., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 491 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
220. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796

(1971).

221. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
222. The plaintiffs in Vasquez must show that the freezer salesmen memorized a
misleading sales pitch-not that they always used the pitch. Purchase of securities at
"inflated prices" will be enough proof that shareholders relied on defendants' misleading statement in Dolgow. In Fisher v. Wolfinbager, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,235
(W.D. Ky. 1971), the court held that class recovery for a lOb-5 violation would be
proper if only the named plaintiffs proved reliance.
223. Siegel v. Realty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), citing Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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misrepresentation is not a procedural difficulty but goes to the very
core of the common law tort of fraud. According to Professor Prosser's
definition of fraud,
[t]he false representation must have played a material and substantial part in leading the plaintiff to adopt his particular course; and
when he was unaware of it at the time that he acted, or it is clear
that he was not in any way influenced by it, and would have done the
same thing without
it for other reasons, his loss is not attributed to
224
the defendant.
If the elements of fraud and misrepresentation are changing in order
to accommodate the class action, these changes must be brought into
the open and discussed, not dismissed as mere "procedural difficulties."225
The enabling act under which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are promulgated provides that the "rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right ....,,221 The act does not specify
whether merely substantive statutory rights are protected,2 7 but the
decision of the Supreme Court in Provident Tradesmen Bank & Trust
Co. v. Pattersonz2 s indicates that the substantive rights protected by
the enabling act may be nonstatutory. In two cases decided under the
Erie doctrine, 229 the Court held that questions regarding burden of
proof are substantive issues so that federal courts must follow the
burden of proof rules of the forum state as to non-federal causes of
224. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 103 (3d ed. 1964).
225. One court has realistically evaluated the problem:
It cannot be lightly overlooked that as a class gets larger it may transform
into a gigantic burden on the Court's resources beyond its capacity to manage
or effectively control. The practical possibility, then, is that the use of the
procedural remedy of a class suit might provide an administrative need if not,
incentive, to erode and impair observance of the substantive law requirements
for compensable claims under the Securities Laws.
Morris v. Buchard, 51 F.R.D. 530, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
226. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
227. See generally Comment, Class Actions Under New Rule 23 and Federal
Statutes of Limitation: A Study of Conflicting Rationales, 13 VILL. L. REV. 370, 388-92
(1968).
228. 390 U.S. 102 (1967). At issue was whether rule 19(b), which gives a trial
court discretion in whether to dismiss or proceed with an action when a party who may
be affected by the action cannot be joined because of jurisdictional problems, interfered
with the substantive right of an indispensable party to be joined in the action. While
questioning whether the right to joinder is a substantive right, Justice Harlan did not
dispute the contention that there are nonstatutory substantive rights which the enabling
act protects from encroachment by the Federal Rules. Id. at 119.
229. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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action. 230 Thus, since burden of proof is considered a substantive issue,
certainly the question of whether reliance is necessary for an action
in fraud or misrepresentation is also a substantive one.2 3The following language in the Advisory Committee Notes is occasionally cited as authority for eliminating the reliance requirement:
[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action, and
it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate
determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the
class. On the other hand, although having some common core, a
fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class action if there
was material variation in the representations made or in the kinds
23 2
of degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were addressed.
While recognizing that "the kinds or degrees of reliance" might pose
problems for a class action, the Advisory Committee totally disregarded the problem of how plaintiff can prove reliance at all without
bringing the class members before the court.
Alteration of substantive law in the wake of Vasquez can be
seen in a recent California case, Melvin v. First Charter Financial
Corp.2 3 3 That case involved a class action brought on behalf of junior
lienholders against senior lienholders who allegedly solicited and encouraged their common lienees to take out certain property-related
loans which were added to the senior encumbrance. The complaint
alleged that the seniors had notice of the junior liens and thus the
new loans created liens subordinate to the juniors liens. In passing on
the class allegation, the court used Vasquez type reasoning in holding
that plaintiffs may be able to prove defendants had notice of all the
junior liens through defendants' own testimony and records. The court
went further, however, and held that
if, at a later stage of the proceedings, the court found actual notice
would have to be proven on an individual basis, if such appeared
230. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlop,
308 U.S. 208 (1939). The fact that these decisions were limited to non-federal causes
of action is insignificant. The important fact is that the Court decided burden of proof
is a substantive issue. But see United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D. 216
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
231. In Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969), the Court held that individual claims cannot be aggregated for the purpose of establishing federal jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). See also Zahn v. International Paper Co., 94 S. Ct.
505 (1973).
232. Advisory Committee Notes 103.
233. Civil No. 29692 (1st Dist., Cal., May 30, 1972) (memorandum of opinion).
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to be insubstantial compared with the questions which could be
proven commonly to all plaintiffs, the court should allow the plaintiffs Eatons to sue on behalf of the class. 234
It is difficult to see how the Melvin court could imagine that proof of
notice would be an insubstantial requirement since notice of a prior
junior lien is the key element which bars a senior lienor from adding
a future advance to his original lien. 23 5
California Civil Code section 1711 can be interpreted to permit
a class action for fraud, but the statute still requires that every member of the class must be misled by the alleged wrongdoing. 20 One of
the draftsmen of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act 37 has
noted that intent or knowledge on the part of a seller need not be
shown in order to prove any of the 16 deceptive business practices
proscribed by the Act. Intent and knowledge were excluded "because
the inclusion of a scienter requirement would have resurrected all the
difficulties inherent in proving common law fraud and correspondingly
diminished the utility of the statute." 238 The Consumer Legal Remedies Act, however, does not purport to alter the common law requirement of reliance by the buyer.
It may be that in securities cases, it would be impossible to expect
the millions of class members individually to prove reliance. But at
least they could be required to submit a signed declaration that they
relied. In consumer class actions, where the number of class members
is often a few hundred or even a few thousand, the signed declarations of reliance would not create large procedural difficulties.2 31
234. Id. at 11.
235. See Turner v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 242 Cal. App. 2d 457, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 552 (1st Dist. 1966); Lumber & Builder's Supply Co. v. Ritz, 134 Cal. App. 607,
25 P.2d 1002 (4th Dist. 1933).
236. "One who practices a deceit with intent to defraud the public, or a particular
class of persons, is deemed to have intended to defraud every individual in that class,
who is actually misled by the deceit." CAL. CrV. CODE § 1711 (West 1973).

237. Id. §§ 1750-84.

238. Reed, supra note 140, at 12.
239. A hearsay objection to the use of these declarations might arise if a defendant contests plaintiffs' reliance and in return plaintiffs attempt to offer declarations
into evidence. That problem is no greater, however, than the problem which will occur
under Vasquez if defendant offers evidence that class members could not have relied
on his salesmen's pitches because the memorized pitches were not recited in every case.
The court in Vasquez would then have to dismiss the class action, further alter the
reliance/misrepresentation doctrine, or require some of the unnamed plaintiffs to testify.
But see In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F.
Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). "[T]he court cannot conclude that defendants are constitutionally entitled to compel a parade of individual plaintiffs to establish damages." Id.
at 289.
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E. Due Process and Other Violations
Mention has already been made of the boilerplate character of
many class action complaints. 240 The distinctions between boilerplate
class action allegations and other boilerplate pleadings, such as inflated damage prayers are obvious. With other boilerplate pleadings,
the defendant has the opportunity to discover the accuracy of plaintiff's claims before any settlement negotiations begin. Such discovery
is nearly impossible with class actions. The class action defendant does
not know the size of the class nor does he have anything but the most
extreme estimate of his potential liability. Most reprehensible is the
use of the class, action allegation to force settlements. Proponents
of the pressure device are not bashful in their desire to use the judicial system as an instrument of coercion.
Where, in an individual action, evidence of the group nature of the
wrong .. . might be irrelevant and inadmissible, in a class action the
reach is broader, encompassing a wider limit for proof. This, of
course, improves the chances of success2 by
increasing the defendant's
41
difficulties in replying to the allegations.

The same writer has noted the importance of newspaper publicity of
the class complaint not only as a non-court approved method of notifying class members but also of punishing defendants long before trial:
The notoriety of the situation becomes such that newspaper reporting
often gives the action front-page billing, and the greater the public
awareness of the wrongs, the less the likelihood that the defendant
will be able to continue his fraudulent practices. Not only will the defendant's business suffer the consequences of such notoriety, but other
injured persons, who either have bee, hesitant to complain or
ignorant
of their right to do so, will step forward to join in the
242
action.

With that statement, Mr. Starrs, like so many other class action proponents, appears to miss the basic nature of Anglo-American civil
jurisprudence; a defendant is not liable merely because a complaint
has been filed against him. Mr. Starrs assumes that every class claim
240. See note 14 supra & accompanying text
241. Starrs, supra note 35, at 411. See also Goldhammer, supra note 146.
242. Starrs, supra note 35, at 410. "In the antitrust context, the effect of notice,
rather than to enable a group to bring an action, may merely serve to provide leverage
in settlement negotiations and to allow counsel to take advantage of the 'legitimized solicitation of claims.'" Comment, supra note 227, at 386-87 (footnote omitted). See also
Cherner v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962).
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against a business is valid. 243 If it is the publicity of the plaintiffs' side
of the controversy which Mr. Starrs deems to be so destructive to defendants, then a defendant's public protestation of innocence is likely
to have little effect. The idea that civil cases ought to be tried through
press releases, or perhaps through advertising agencies is absurd.
Proponents of the class action as a pressure device answer such
criticism with policy arguments similar to the following: American
business has used the courts to gouge American consumers for centuries-it is time to retaliate.244 Assuming, arguendo, the validity of
the premise, the conclusion does not follow. The proved or unproved
dishonesty of a single or a million corporations or businessmen over
243. Professor Lobell has remarked:
Instead of being employed to remedy obvious and well defined consumer
wrongs, many class actions seek enormous statutory penalties based upon minor
variations in form or on claims that are simply trivial and not in the public
interest. Such actions are frequently brought against legitimate businesses in the
hope of compelling a settlement without regard to the merits of the claim. And,
again without regard to its merits, the mere filing of such an action, depending
upon its magnitude, may adversely affect the market for a public company's
securities as well as the company's ability to obtain financing for necessary activities. In all events, the expense of potential litigation may well ultimately
have to be borne by all consumers in the form of higher prices.
Lobell, supra note 125, at 1053.
Another commentator has discussed the effect of huge class action claims and adverse publicity:
mhe aggregate amounts claimed in some alleged class actions are of such
magnitude that defendants must often accede to some settlement, regardless of
the merits of the claim, and regardless of the difficulties in effecting such a
settlement ....
The credit status of an economically sound corporation can be
critically affected by the mere existence of such an action.
Weither, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L.R.
515, 522 (1968).
In ruling that a hearing would be necessary to determine if a class action would
be proper, Judge Weinstein made the following comment:
The notice provisions themselves may prove harmful to defendants since the
attendant publicity and its official source may inflate the apparent importance
of the action . . . . (If this Court were to grant plaintiffs' motion [for class
standing], the normal consequence would be that many persons would incorrectly infer that this Court regarded the plaintiffs' complaint as prima fade
well-founded). So much of the stock market depends upon faith and reputation that the Court should be reluctant to lend its weight to any unnecessary publicity in connection with a pending lawsuit.
Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
244. Professor Louisell and his collaborators have phrased the argument not in
terms of retaliation but in terms of the equalization of power:
[Tjhe class action is a significant step in equalizing the bargaining power of
the consumer with that of the seller. This step helps achieve optimal working of the judicial system for, as so often, the adversary process functions
best when the opposing parties are equally powerful.
Loulsell, Miller & West, supranote 12, at 1062.
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the last decade or the last few centuries has no bearing on the liability
of any particular defendant against whom an action is filed. Consumer
advocates have heralded recent cases and decisions which give to consumers due process rights against creditors' summary attachments or
garnishments. 245 Ironically, these consumer advocates view publicity
and forced settlement as legitimate weapons of the class action, despite
246
their summary nature and lack of due process.
One of the most distressing trends of the recent class action liberalization has been the ascendance of the courts as class advocates.
Professor Homburger has welcomed this trend:
The management of class actions requires a strong and active court
which does not content itself with passing on the propriety of the
maintenance of the class action, but is willing to share responsibility
with the parties in developing the case. Class actions require a new
approach to the functions of the courts and parties, reminiscent of
the civil law approach where the judge often participates in the
proceedings, guiding and assisting the parties, even at the risk of overinvolvement. In short, the success of the class action may well depend
on the willingness and the capability of the court to work with the
parties in planning and organizing the trial in the interest of the
efficient and fair adjudication of the litigation. The principle of ade245. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 409 U.S. 902 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405
U.S. 191 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Randone v.
Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971); Truth in
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1671-77 (1970).
246. Some lawyers have argued that the class action is always a manageable device because of the strong possibility of settlement:
At the hearing on the class action issue in the Newark Gasoline cases, a prominent plaintiffs' antitrust lawyer assured the Court that a class action on behalf
of eight million users was manageable because:
I have seen nothing so conducive to settlement of complex litigation
as the establishment by the court of a class. When two very competently represented and major litigants have settled, I think it shows
this. It shows that the problem is manageable. It shows that they feel
that this is the way that the litigation can be disposed of by settlement namely, by having a class; whereas, if there were no class, it
would not be disposed of by settlement. So I think that you sow the
seed for the possibility of a settlement.
The class action device can be used to coerce a settlement even without
filing suit. Most experienced defense counsel have participated in negotiations toward settlement of a dispute at which counsel for the potential plaintiff threatens to file a massive class action to intimidate the potential defendant
into a favorable settlement. The weaker the potential plaintiff's claim, the
more likely he is to make such a threat since a litigant with a valid claim
could not expect as large a recovery as a member of a large class. Where
the client in fact has a valid substantial claim, a class action is actually not
in his self-interest.
Simon, supra note 192, at 390 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added by Simon).
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quacy of representation by the representative parties must be complemented by the principle of adequacy of judicial management in
order to justify dispensing with those fundamental rules that guarantee
to each party his day in court in person or by a self-chosen representative.... A deliberate shift from the normal American mode of
the adversary procedure to a procedure more oriented toward courtprosecution would seem justifiable on the ground that the public is
vitally interested in the just disposition of controversies involving
numerous parties whose claims or defense could not be adjusted fairly
247
and efficiently by the application of more conventional methods.
Professor Homburger's analysis begs the question. Perhaps it is a mistake to apply judicial resources so fully when, for the most part, individual class members have been slightly injured. 48 Furthermore, it
may be that "just disposition of controversies" is impossible when
American courts alter their traditional role for the benefit of large
groups of plaintiffs. For example, the common law tradition of partisan
advocates and neutral judges is violated when prior to trial, the court
makes a finding that there is a 90 percent probibility that the defendant is liable and, therefore, the defendant must pay 90 percent of
2 9
the costs of notice to the class at the outset of the litigation. ' Prejudgment of issues in that manner may be a violation of procedural
due process. As the American College of Trial Lawyers' study stated:
[D]ue to the inherently unmanageable nature of certain class actions,
some courts have exhibited a tendency to overlook fundamental procedural and substantive rights of the party opposing the class in order
to implement what are claimed to be the policies underlying the
provisions of Rule 23. Thus the rule becomes workable only in those
instances where traditional notions of equity and fairness have been
temporarily abandoned....
The courts, thrust into the role of a protector of the public con247. Homburger, supra note 25, at 657-58.

248. The need to balance the tremendous amount of litigation brought today
against the possible small recoveries of certain class suits was discussed above as was
the question whether uninterested parties should be brought into litigation through

opt-out notice. A startling example of the prejudice in favor of class plaintiffs, even
against some plaintiffs' desires, can be found in the Second Circuit's handling of the
first Eisen appeal:

[D]efendants argued that different members of the class will have varying
theories as to what constitutes the 'excessive price,' and other class members
may be satisfied with the present price policy. Nonetheless, all members of the
class, including those who would otherwise prefer to abide by the statu3 quo,
will be helped if the rates are found to be excessive.
Eisen II 562.
249. Eisen V 573. See Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 54 F.R.D. 465 (W.D.
Pa. 1972) (costs shared equally between defendants and named plaintiffs).

CLASS ACTIONS
science at the expense of their judicial function, are being forced to
relieve these 25pressures
on the basis of practicality rather than sound
0
legal theory.
A California court has recently said that one reason for allowing
a class action in a real property security dispute is because "secured
transactions [are] a rather complex area of law. ' 251 This implies that
where the law is complex it is the court's duty to assist plaintiffs. The
desire to "help" class plaintiffs obscures the court's function as an objective fact finder. For example, in the second Harper & Row case,
while supposedly deciding the issue of the maintenance of the various
cases as one class action, Judge Decker made the following statement:
"[T]he extensive litigation already commenced illustrates the widespread, but diffuse nature of the injury inflicted upon the public libraries and schools. ' 252 Clearly, Judge Decker decided the merits of
the case before he had even passed on the class issue.
In dealing with the problem of serving notice to the class, the
early Harper & Row court was caught in the dilemma of not wanting
plaintiffs' counsel to notify the class, yet not wishing to take upon
itself such onerous burdens:
We have little doubt that our appearance of detached impartiality
would be seriously impaired by any delegation to plaintiffs' counsel
of the Court's duty to frame and serve suitable notice on all class
members. Observation and long experience have taught us that the
mere service of notice upon the hundreds who would be involved is
far more likely to be the beginning, rather than the end, of frustrating
complexities. Inquiries inevitably ensue, one upon another, which
must be answered or ignored. To answer involves the Court in direct
correspondence with a prospective litigant in a pending case, a very
questionable judicial undertaking. To ignore an inquiry, which the
Court appears to have invited by a notice to a prospective litigant
to 'opt-out' or be joined, would cast doubt and suspicion upon the
judicial process. .

.

. We are loath to impose upon the already over-

burdened clerical facilities of this court the onerous task of preparing
and forwarding to all the proposed members of the class the notices
required by new Rule25323(c), and the ensuing detail of the consequent record-keeping.
250. ACTL REPORT, supra note 18, at 161.
251. Melvin v. First Charter Fin. Corp., Civil No. 29692, at 11 (1st Dist. Cal.,
May 30, 1972) (memorandum of opinion).
252. Illinois v. Harper & Row Publ., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 489 (N.D. 11.

1969).

253. School Dist. v. Harper & Row Publ., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001, 1005 (E.D.
Pa. 1967).
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Partly because of that dilemma, the court dismissed the class action although its decision was subsequently reversed. 25 4 The court's dilemma
has been partially solved by the recommendations of the Manual for
Complex and Multidistrict Litigation.2 5 Nevertheless, the first Harper
& Row court understood the potential for undesirable consequences if
25 1
it identified itself too strongly with the plaintiffs.
While admitting that "serious due process questions" arise from
the notice procedures of the California Consumers Legal Remedies
Act, one of the draftsmen of that Act has written that such questions
must be decided in the consumers' benefit since "the purpose of the
Act is to protect consumers and provide them with efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection. ' 257 In other words, when
consumers bring a class action, the due process rights of the defendants are to be ignored.
CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to demonstrate that the class action is
incapable of handling every conceivable consumer or stockholder
claim. New procedures must be devised in order to make the class
action an effective tool in truly necessary cases. Furthermore, other
devices must be created or expanded to provide consumer relief. The
class action is not the only means for providing consumer protection
from unscrupulous businessmen. Legislatures can pass statutes which
permit courts to award attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs in consumer cases. Legislatures can strengthen business practice laws and
can provide more funds for agency policing of unlawful commercial
conduct. Recent California statutes, for example, have made civil
penalties available in governmental consumer fraud actions. In addition, where individual claims are small and the unmanageable consequences of a class action are large, an injunctive order may offer sufficient remedial value.
254. Illinois v. Harper & Row Publ., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. II1. 1969).
255. See note 185 supra & accompanying text.
256. Other due process violations have been attributed to rule 23, including violations of class members' right to know the conflicts of interest the class attorney may
have. Simon, supra note 192, at 387. See also MANUAL FOR THE CONDUCT OF PRETRIAL
HEARINGS ON CLASS ACTION ISSUES OF THE Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT 19 (1973)
wherein named plaintiffs' are required to divulge their potential conflicts of interest. Mr.

Simon has commented regarding the bifurcation of liability and damage/reliance trials
that "[tihe use of separate trials for liability and damages, either before separate juries or
with damages decided by a master, violates defendants' due process rights .... ." Simon,
supra note 192, at 386.
257. Reed, supra note 140, at 16-17.

